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We consider social welfare functions that satisfy Arrow’s classic axioms of in-
dependence of irrelevant alternatives and Pareto optimality when the outcome
space is the convex hull of some finite set of alternatives. Individual and col-
lective preferences are assumed to be continuous and convex, which guarantees
the existence of maximal elements and the consistency of choice functions that
return these elements, even without insisting on transitivity. We provide char-
acterizations of both the domains of preferences and the social welfare functions
that allow for anonymous Arrovian aggregation. The domains admit arbitrary
preferences over alternatives, which completely determine an agent’s prefer-
ences over all mixed outcomes. On these domains, Arrow’s impossibility turns
into a complete characterization of a unique social welfare function, which can
be readily applied in settings involving divisible resources such as probability,
time, or money.
1. Introduction
A central concept in welfare economics are social welfare functions (SWFs) in the tradition
of Arrow, i.e., functions that map a collection of individual preference relations over some
set of alternatives to a social preference relation over the alternatives. Arrow’s seminal
theorem states that every SWF that satisfies Pareto optimality and independence of ir-
relevant alternatives is dictatorial (Arrow, 1951). This sweeping impossibility significantly
strengthened an earlier observation by Condorcet (1785) and sent shockwaves throughout
welfare economics, political philosophy, economic theory, and even seemingly unrelated
disciplines such as philosophy of science and engineering design (see, e.g., Maskin and Sen,
2014; Sen, 2017; Gaertner, 2019). A large body of subsequent work has studied whether
more positive results can be obtained by modifying implicit assumptions on the domain
of admissible preferences, both individually and collectively. Two main approaches can be
distinguished.
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The first approach, pioneered by Sen (1969), is based on the observation that “Arrow’s
requirement that social preferences be transitive is probably the least defensible of the
conditions that lead to his dictatorship result” (Blair and Pollak, 1982). Consequently, the
idea is to weaken the assumption of transitivity of collective preferences to quasi-transitivity,
acyclicity, path independence, or similar conditions. Although this does allow for non-
dictatorial aggregation functions that meet Arrow’s criteria, these functions turned out
to be highly objectionable, usually on grounds of involving weak kinds of dictatorships or
violating other conditions deemed to be indispensable for reasonable preference aggregation
(for an overview of the extensive literature, see Kelly, 1978; Sen, 1977, 1986; Schwartz, 1986;
Campbell and Kelly, 2002). Particularly noteworthy are results about acyclic collective
preference relations (e.g., Mas-Colell and Sonnenschein, 1972; Brown, 1975; Blau and Deb,
1977; Blair and Pollak, 1982; Blair and Pollack, 1983; Banks, 1995) because acyclicity is
necessary and sufficient for the existence of maximal elements when there is a finite number
of alternatives. Sen (1995) concludes that “the arbitrariness of power of which Arrow’s case
of dictatorship is an extreme example, lingers in one form or another even when transitivity
is dropped, so long as some regularity is demanded (such as the absence of cycles).”
Another stream of research has analyzed the implications of imposing additional struc-
ture on individual preferences. This has resulted in a number of positive results for re-
stricted domains, such as dichotomous or single-peaked preferences, which allow for at-
tractive SWFs (e.g., Black, 1948; Arrow, 1951; Inada, 1969; Sen and Pattanaik, 1969;
Ehlers and Storcken, 2008). Many domains of economic interest are concerned with in-
finite sets of outcomes, which satisfy structural restrictions such as compactness and
convexity. Preferences over these outcomes are typically assumed to satisfy some form
of continuity and convexity, i.e., they are robust with respect to minimal changes in
outcomes and with respect to convex combinations of outcomes. Various results have
shown that Arrow’s impossibility remains intact under these assumptions (e.g., Kalai et al.,
1979; Border, 1983; Bordes and Le Breton, 1989, 1990a,b; Campbell, 1989; Redekop, 1995).
Le Breton and Weymark (2011) provide an overview and conclude that “economic domain
restrictions do not provide a satisfactory way of avoiding Arrovian social choice impossi-
bilities, except when the set of alternatives is one-dimensional and preferences are single-
peaked.”
The point of departure for the present approach is the observation that all these impossi-
bilities involve some form of transitivity (e.g., acyclicity), even though no such assumption
is necessary to guarantee the existence of maximal elements in domains of continuous and
convex preferences. Sonnenschein (1971) has shown that all continuous and convex pref-
erence relations admit a maximal element in every non-empty, compact, and convex set
of outcomes. Moreover, returning maximal elements under the given conditions satisfies
standard properties of choice consistency introduced by Sen (1969, 1971). Continuous
and convex preference relations can thus be interpreted as rationalizing relations for the
choice behavior of rational agents and there is little justification for demanding transitiv-
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ity.1 Transitivity has repeatedly been criticized for being overly demanding (see, e.g., May,
1954; Fishburn, 1970; Bar-Hillel and Margalit, 1988; Fishburn, 1991; Anand, 1993, 2009).
Anand (2009) concludes, “once considered a cornerstone of rational choice theory, the sta-
tus of transitivity has been dramatically reevaluated by economists and philosophers in
recent years.”
Summary of Results
We show that Arrow’s theorem ceases to hold for convex outcome sets when dispensing
with transitivity, and, moreover, Arrow’s axioms characterize a unique anonymous SWF
that we refer to as pairwise utilitarianism. The SWF is utilitarian because collective prefer-
ences are obtained by adding the canonical skew-symmetric bilinear (SSB) utility functions
representing the agents’ ordinal preferences. SSB utility functions assign a utility value to
each pair of alternatives and are more general than traditional linear utility functions. The
SWF is pairwise in the sense that it merely takes into account the numbers of agents who
prefer one alternative to another and also satisfies Condorcet’s pairwise majority criterion.
More precisely, we consider a convex set of outcomes consisting of all probability mea-
sures on some finite abstract set of alternatives, which we refer to as pure outcomes. These
outcome sets, for example, arise when allocating a divisible resource (such as probabil-
ity, time, or money) to alternatives. The canonical example is the standard unstructured
social choice setting that also allows for lotteries between alternatives. Individual and
collective preference relations over these outcomes are assumed to satisfy continuity, con-
vexity, and a mild symmetry condition. In order to motivate these assumptions, we prove
that continuity and convexity are necessary and sufficient for consistent choice behavior,
mirroring a classic characterization by Sen (1971) in the finite non-convex choice setting
(see Proposition 2 in Section 4). We then show that there is a unique inclusion-maximal
Cartesian domain of preference profiles that allows for anonymous Arrovian aggregation
and satisfies minimal richness conditions (see Theorem 1 in Section 7). This domain al-
lows for arbitrary preferences over pure outcomes, which in turn completely determine an
agent’s preferences over all remaining outcomes. When interpreting outcomes as lotteries,
this preference extension has a particularly simple and intuitive explanation: one lottery
is preferred to another if and only if the former is more likely to return a more preferred
alternative. Incidentally, this preference extension, which constitutes a central special case
of SSB utility functions as introduced by Fishburn (1982), is supported by recent exper-
1Another frequently cited reason to justify transitivity is the money pump, where an agent with cyclic
preferences over three outcomes is deceived into paying unlimited amounts of money in an infinite series
of cyclical exchanges. As Fishburn (1991) notes, however, the money pump “applies transitive thinking
[in the form of money] to an intransitive world [given the agent’s preferences]”. Another issue with the
money pump in our framework is that it cleverly avoids convexity of the feasible set by splitting it up
into three subsets whose union is not convex. If the agent were confronted with a choice from the convex
hull of the three original outcomes, he could simply pick his (unique) most-preferred mixed outcome
and would not be tempted to exchange it when offered any other outcome in the future.
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imental evidence (see Section 7). We also provide an alternative characterization of SSB
utility functions using continuity and convexity, which may be of independent interest (see
Proposition 3 in Section 5).
Our main theorem shows that the only Arrovian SWFs on this domain are affine utili-
tarian with respect to the underlying SSB utility functions (see Theorem 2 in Section 6).
As a consequence, there is a unique anonymous Arrovian SWF, which compares outcomes
by the sign of the bilinear form given by the pairwise majority margins. The resulting
collective preference relation over pure outcomes coincides with majority rule and the cor-
responding choice function is therefore consistent with Condorcet’s principle of selecting
a pure outcome that is majority-preferred to every other pure outcome whenever this is
possible.2 This relation is naturally extended to mixed outcomes such that every compact
and convex set of outcomes admits a collectively most preferred outcome. In the context
of lotteries, the collective preference relation admits a very intuitive interpretation: in or-
der to compare two lotteries p and q, randomly sample a pure outcome a from p, a pure
outcome b from q, and an agent i from the uniform distribution over agents. Then, p is
collectively preferred to q if and only if the probability that agent i prefers a to b is greater
than the probability that he prefers b to a.
We also show that, when restricting attention to von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences
over outcomes, anonymous Arrovian aggregation is only possible for dichotomous prefer-
ences and the only SWF to do so corresponds to the well-known approval voting rule (see
Theorems 3 and 4 in Appendix D). Our results can thus be interpreted as a generalization
of both the domain of dichotomous preferences and approval voting.
Illustrative Example
The most natural setting where our assumptions apply is that of preference aggregation
when the outcome set consists of all lotteries over a finite set of alternatives. By contrast,
this subsection discusses the application of our results to a budget allocation setting from
public finance. Even though the assumption of convex preferences is somewhat restrictive
in this context, we think that the example nicely illustrates the premises and consequences
as well as the limitations of our results.
Imagine that a representative body, consisting of 100 delegates, aims at reaching a joint
decision on how to divide a nation’s tax budget between four departments: education,
transportation, health, and military. The delegates belong to different parties (A, B, C,
and D) and each party already put forward a favored budget proposal (see Table 1).3 We
assume, for simplicity, that there are four groups of delegates with identical preferences,
2It is therefore in line with Dasgupta and Maskin (2008) who, also based on Arrow’s axioms, have forcefully
argued in favor of majority rule in domains where Condorcet winners are guaranteed to exist. Our
arguments extend to unrestricted preferences over pure outcomes.
3One issue ignored here is how to arrive at the set of budget proposals. In particular, it is required that
the proposals are affinely independent.
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A B C D
Pairwise
Utilitarianism
Education 40% 30% 20% 10% 25.0 %
Transportation 30% 10% 30% 30% 26.7 %
Health 20% 40% 30% 20% 30.0 %
Military 10% 20% 20% 40% 18.3 %
25 20 45 10
A B C D
B A A B
C C D C
D D B A
Table 1: Public finance example. Four budget proposals (A, B, C, and D), the preferences
of 100 delegates over these proposals, and the rounded budget allocation returned
by pairwise utilitarianism.
which could—for example—correspond to the four parties, but emphasize that no such
assumption is required for our results. In fact, no restrictions whatsoever are imposed on
the delegates’ preferences over proposals. As a consequence, Arrow’s theorem implies that
every non-dictatorial Pareto optimal SWF violates independence of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA), i.e., collective preferences over pairs of proposals may depend on individual prefer-
ences over other, unrelated, proposals. Moreover, in the given profile of preferences, the
pairwise majority relation is cyclic and every proposal is unstable in the sense that it can
be overthrown by a majority of the delegates.
In the described setting, it seems fairly natural to extend the space of possible outcomes
by allowing to compromise between the different proposals such that the set of outcomes
is now the convex hull of A, B, C, and D. A fifty-fifty mixture of proposals A and B, for
instance, will be written as 1/2A+ 1/2B and assigns 35% of the budget to education, 20%
to transportation, 30% to health, and 15% to military. When assuming that the delegates’
preferences over this enlarged, infinite, set of outcomes satisfy continuity and convexity and
an innocuous symmetry condition, such preferences can be represented by bilinear utility
functions. Note, however, that these assumptions do not allow for decreasing marginal
returns for increasingly large investments as well as complementarities and substitutabilities
among departments.
One may now wonder whether there exist Arrovian SWFs for this modified setting. Our
first theorem shows that, since we insist on allowing arbitrary preferences over proposals,
anonymous Arrovian aggregation is only possible when preferences over proposals are ex-
tended to preferences over mixtures of proposals by sampling proposals from each mixture
and preferring the mixture which wins more pairwise comparisons. According to this pref-
erence extension, the 25 delegates who prefer proposals A to B to C to D are, for example,
assumed to prefer 2/3A+ 1/3C to proposal B and to be indifferent between proposal C and
1/2A+ 1/2D. Even though preferences over proposals are transitive, some preferences over
mixed outcomes will be cyclic. This effect is known as the Steinhaus-Trybula paradox (see
Figure 3 on Page 18).
Our second theorem shows that there is a unique anonymous Arrovian SWF on this
5
preference domain, which we refer to as pairwise utilitarianism. This SWF is based on the
bilinear form given by the matrix of pairwise majority margins
φ =
A B C D



0 40 −10 80 A
−40 0 10 −10 B
10 −10 0 80 C
−80 10 −80 0 D
.
Here, φ(A,B) = 40 because the number of delegates who prefer A to B minus the number
of delegates who prefer B to A is (25 + 45) − (20 + 10) = 40. Collective preferences are
obtained by checking the sign of the corresponding value of φ: proposal A is preferred to
proposal B because φ(A,B) = 40 > 0, B is preferred to C because φ(B,C) = 10 > 0,
C is preferred to A because φ(C,A) = 10 > 0. Bilinearity implies that, for example,
1/2A + 1/2C is preferred to B because φ(1/2A + 1/2C,B) = 15 > 0. It follows from the
Minimax Theorem that every convex and closed set contains at least one most-preferred
outcome. In our example, the unique most-preferred outcome is a convex combination of
the first three proposals
p = 1/6A+ 1/6B + 2/3C.
This corresponds to the budget allocation given in the pairwise utilitarianism column of
Table 1. The choice function that returns maximal pairwise utilitarian outcomes satisfies
contraction consistency. Hence, the optimal allocation is not affected if proposal D is
retracted. Moreover, the choice function satisfies expansion consistency, i.e., if allocation p
is not only chosen in the example described above, but also in an alternative choice setting
in which proposal D is replaced with another proposal E, then p would also be chosen if
all five proposals (and their convex combinations) were feasible.
The pairwise utilitarian SWF satisfies Pareto optimality. Proposal C, for example, is
socially preferred to 1/2A + 1/2D because the agents represented in columns 1, 2, and 4
are indifferent between both outcomes while those represented in column 3 strictly prefer
the former to the latter. The SWF also satisfies IIA in the sense that collective preferences
between outcomes in the convex closure of some subset of proposals only depend on the
individual preferences between these outcomes. For example, all preferences between out-
comes in the convex closure of two proposals only depend on the pairwise majority relation
between these proposals. Moreover, the collective preferences between all outcomes in the
convex closure of any triple of proposals are independent of individual preferences over
outcomes that involve the fourth proposal. Of course, more significant than the observa-
tion that pairwise utilitarianism satisfies Pareto optimality and IIA is the fact that it is
the only such SWF.4
4The public finance example can also be used to illustrate two further desirable properties of the maximal
pairwise utilitarian choice function. It is population-consistent in the sense that merging two bodies of
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2. Related Work
A special case of our setting, which has been well-studied, concerns individual preferences
over lotteries that satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) axioms, i.e., preferences
that can be represented by assigning cardinal utilities to alternatives such that lotteries are
compared based on the expected utility they produce. Samuelson (1967) conjectured that
Arrow’s impossibility still holds under these assumptions and Kalai and Schmeidler (1977b)
showed that this is indeed the case when there are at least four alternatives. Hylland (1980)
later pointed out that a continuity assumption made by Kalai and Schmeidler is not re-
quired. There are other versions of Arrow’s impossibility for vNM preferences, which differ
in modeling assumptions and whether SWFs aggregate cardinal utilities or the preference
relations represented by these utilities. A detailed comparison of these results is given in
Appendix A.
Our results apply to Arrovian aggregation of preferences over lotteries under much loos-
ened assumptions about preferences over lotteries. In particular, the axioms we presume
entail that preferences over lotteries can be represented by skew-symmetric bilinear (SSB)
utility functions, which assign a utility value to each pair of lotteries. One lottery is pre-
ferred to another lottery if the SSB utility for this pair is positive. SSB utility theory is
a generalization of linear expected utility theory due to von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1947), which does not require the controversial independence axiom and transitivity (see,
e.g., Fishburn, 1982, 1984b, 1988). Independence prescribes that a lottery p is preferred
to lottery q if and only if a coin toss between p and a third lottery r is preferred to a coin
toss between q and r (with the same coin used in both cases). There is experimental evi-
dence that independence is systematically violated by human decision makers. The Allais
Paradox is perhaps the most famous example (Allais, 1953). Detailed reviews of such vio-
lations, including those reported by Kahnemann and Tversky (1979), have been provided
by Machina (1983, 1989) and McClennen (1988). An interesting historical perspective on
the independence axiom has been given by Fishburn and Wakker (1995).
Our characterization of Arrovian SWFs is related to Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation
Theorem (Harsanyi, 1955), which shows that, for von Neumann-Morgenstern prefer-
ences over lotteries, affine utilitarianism already follows from Pareto indifference (see
Fleurbaey et al., 2008, for an excellent exposition and various extensions of this theo-
rem). Harsanyi’s theorem is a statement about Bergson-Samuelson social welfare func-
tions, i.e., a single preference profile is considered in isolation. As a consequence, the
weights associated with the agents’ utility functions may depend on their preferences.
This can be prevented by adding axioms that connect the collective preferences across
different profiles. The SWF that derives the collective preferences by adding up util-
ity representations normalized to the unit interval is known as relative utilitarianism
delegates, each of which came to the same conclusion, will not affect the outcome and it is composition-
consistent, which—among other things—implies that the choice function cannot be manipulated by
introducing additional proposals, which are very similar to existing ones. (see Brandl et al., 2016).
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(Dhillon, 1998; Dhillon and Mertens, 1999; Börgers and Choo, 2015, 2017). It was char-
acterized by Dhillon and Mertens (1999) using a weakening of IIA and further axioms
(see Footnote 13). As shown by Fishburn and Gehrlein (1987) and further explored by
Turunen-Red and Weymark (1999), aggregating SSB utility functions is fundamentally
different from aggregating von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions in that Harsanyi’s
Pareto indifference axiom (and strengthenings thereof) do not imply affine utilitarianism.
As we show in this paper, this can be rectified by considering Arrow’s multi-profile frame-
work and assuming IIA. Mongin (1994, Proposition 1) gives a similar characterization of
affine utilitarianism for social welfare functionals (SWFLs), which operate on profiles of
cardinal utility functions. The framework of SWFLs (without any invariance property on
utility functions) involves interpersonal comparisons of utilities, which significantly weakens
the force of IIA (see also Appendix A).
The probabilistic voting rule that returns the maximal elements of the unique anony-
mous Arrovian SWF is known as maximal lotteries (Kreweras, 1965; Fishburn, 1984a) and
was recently axiomatized using two consistency conditions (Brandl et al., 2016). Indepen-
dently, maximal lotteries have also been studied in the context of randomized matching
and assignment (see, e.g., Kavitha et al., 2011; Aziz et al., 2013).
When the set of outcomes cannot be assumed to be convex (for example, because it
is finite), a common approach to address the intransitivity of collective preferences is
to define alternative notions of maximality, rationalizability, or welfare, leading to con-
cepts such as transitive closure maximality or the uncovered set (see, e.g., Laslier, 1997;
Brandt and Harrenstein, 2011; Nishimura, 2018; Brandt et al., 2018). Interestingly, the
support of maximal lotteries, which is known as the bipartisan set or the essential set
(Laffond et al., 1993; Laslier, 2000), also appears in this literature, even though this ap-
proach is fundamentally different from the one pursued in this paper.
3. Preliminaries
Let U be a non-empty and finite universal set of alternatives. By ∆ we denote the set of
all probability measures on U . We assume that ∆ is equipped with the topology induced
by the standard Euclidian topology on RU . For X ⊆ U , let ∆X be the set of probability
measures in ∆ with support in X, i.e., ∆X = {p ∈ ∆: p(X) = 1}. We will refer to
elements of ∆ as outcomes and one-point measures in ∆ as pure outcomes. The convex
hull of a set of outcomes X ∈ ∆ will be denoted by conv(X). For p, q, r ∈ ∆, we write
conv(p, q, r) instead of the more clumsy conv({p, q, r}). For p, q ∈ ∆ and λ ∈ [0, 1], we
write [p, q] = conv(p, q), [p, q) = [p, q] \ {q}, (p, q] = [p, q] \ {p}, (p, q) = [p, q) ∩ (p, q], and
pλq = λp+ (1− λ)q for short.
The preferences of an agent are represented by an asymmetric binary relation ≻ over ∆
called the preference relation. Given two outcomes p, q ∈ ∆, we write p ∼ q when neither
p ≻ q nor q ≻ p, and p % q if p ≻ q or p ∼ q. For p ∈ ∆, let U(p) = {q ∈ ∆: q ≻ p}
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and L(p) = {q ∈ ∆: p ≻ q} be the strict upper and strict lower contour set of p with
respect to ≻; I(p) = {q ∈ ∆: p ∼ q} denotes the indifference set of p. For X ⊆ ∆,
≻|X = {(p, q) ∈ ≻ : p, q ∈ X} is the preference relation ≻ restricted to outcomes in X. We
will consider preference relations that are continuous, i.e., small perturbations to outcomes
retain a strict preference, and convex, i.e., preferences are preserved when taking convex
combinations of outcomes. This amounts to the following restrictions on contour sets for
any p ∈ ∆.
U(p) and L(p) are open. (Continuity)
U(p), L(p), U(p) ∪ I(p), and L(p) ∪ I(p) are convex. (Convexity)
4. Rational and Consistent Choice
The existence of maximal elements is usually quoted as the main reason for insisting on
transitivity of preference relations. It was shown by Sonnenschein (1971) that continuity
and convexity are already sufficient for the existence of maximal elements in non-empty,
compact, and convex sets, even when preferences are intransitive (see also Bergstrom, 1992;
Llinares, 1998). We will refer to any such subset of outcomes X ⊆ ∆ as feasible and denote
the set of all feasible sets by F(∆). Moreover, define max≻(X) = {x ∈ X : x % y for all y ∈
X} for any preference relation ≻ and feasible set X.
Proposition 1. (Sonnenschein, 1971) If ≻ is a continuous and convex preference relation,
then max≻(X) 6= ∅ for every feasible set X.
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In a model that assumes the feasibility of all finite non-empty subsets of outcomes, Sen
(1971) has shown that two intuitive choice consistency conditions, known as Sen’s α (or
contraction) and Sen’s γ (or expansion), are equivalent to choosing maximal elements of
an underlying preference relation (see also Sen, 1977). Moreover, when the total number
of outcomes is finite, such a rationalizing preference relation has to be acyclic because
acyclicity is necessary and sufficient for the existence of maximal elements. With convex
feasible sets such as the ones we are considering, this is no longer the case, and other
properties (such as continuity and convexity) can take over the role of acyclicity. In the
following, we show that Sen’s theorem can be salvaged in our setting when defining choice
functions and choice consistency conditions appropriately.6
A choice function is a function that maps any feasible set to a feasible subset. Formally,
we define choice functions as (upper hemi-) continuous functions S : F(∆) → F(∆) such
5Sonnenschein only required that upper contour sets are convex and that lower contour sets are open.
6Inspired by the classic contributions of Samuelson (1938), Richter (1966), and Afriat (1967), there has
been renewed interest in the rationalizability of choice functions in economic domains such as consumer
demand (see, e.g. Reny, 2015; Chambers and Echenique, 2016; Nishimura et al., 2017). We are, however,
not aware of a contraction-expansion-based characterization of rationalizable choice from convex feasible
sets.
9
that for all X ∈ F(∆), S(X) ⊆ X, and for all p, q ∈ ∆, S([p, q]) ∈ {{p}, {q}, [p, q])}.
Contraction consistency requires that if an outcome is chosen from some set, then it is also
chosen from any subset that it is contained in. A choice function S satisfies contraction if
for all X,Y ∈ F(∆) with X ∩ Y 6= ∅,
S(X) ∩ Y ⊆ S(X ∩ Y ). (Contraction)
Expansion consistency demands that an outcome that is chosen from two sets X and Y ,
should also be chosen from their union X ∪Y . Since we only consider convex feasible sets,
we strengthen this condition by taking the convex hull conv(X ∪Y ) in the consequence. S
satisfies expansion if for all X,Y ∈ F(∆),
S(X) ∩ S(Y ) ⊆ S(conv(X ∪ Y )). (Expansion)
Following Schwartz (1976), the conjunction of contraction and expansion can be nicely
written as a single condition, where for all X,Y ∈ F(∆) with X ∩ Y 6= ∅,
S(X) ∩ S(Y ) = S(conv(X ∪ Y )) ∩X ∩ Y . (Consistency)
The inclusion from left to right is expansion whereas the inclusion from right to left is
equivalent to contraction (see also Brandt and Harrenstein, 2011). A choice function that
satisfies contraction and expansion will be called consistent.
A choice function S is rationalizable if there exists a preference relation ≻ such that for
every X ∈ F(∆), S(X) = max≻X. Let us now consider rationalizability in the context
of continuous and convex preference relations. Any choice function that returns maximal
elements of some continuous and convex relation satisfies contraction and expansion.7 As
we prove in Appendix E, the converse holds as well, i.e., if we insist on consistent choice,
we may restrict our attention to continuous and convex preference relations.
Proposition 2. A choice function is rationalizable via a continuous and convex relation
if and only if it is consistent.
Hence, rational and consistent choice is not only possible without making transitivity
(or acyclicity) assumptions, but even Sen’s fundamental equivalence between rationality
and consistency can be maintained. It follows from Richter’s (1966) theorem that any
consistent choice function is rationalized by its revealed preference relation as introduced
by Houthakker (1950). This relation moreover satisfies continuity and convexity.
7There are also stronger versions of expansion, which, together with contraction, are equivalent to the weak
axiom of revealed preference or Arrow’s choice axiom (Samuelson, 1938; Arrow, 1959). These conditions
imply rationalizability via a transitive relation and are therefore not generally satisfied when choosing
maximal elements of continuous and convex relations.
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5. Skew-Symmetric Bilinear Utility Functions
Convexity of preferences implies that indifference sets are convex. The symmetry axiom
introduced by Fishburn (1982) prescribes that the indifference sets for every triple of out-
comes are straight lines that are either parallel or intersect in one point, which may be
outside of their convex hull. For all p, q, r ∈ ∆ and λ ∈ (0, 1),8
if q ∼ 1/2 p+ 1/2 r and pλr ∼ 1/2 p+ 1/2 q then rλp ∼ 1/2 r + 1/2 q. (Symmetry)
Fishburn (1984b) justifies this axiom by stating that “the degree to which p is preferred to
q is equal in absolute magnitude but opposite in sign to the degree to which q is preferred
p.” He continues by writing that he is “a bit uncertain as to whether this should be
regarded more as a convention than a testable hypothesis – much like the asymmetry axiom
[. . . ], which can almost be thought of as a definitional characteristic of strict preference.”
Without symmetry, continuity and convexity still allow for rather unintuitive preference
relations. For example, let U = {a, b} and consider the preference relation ≻ on ∆ with
p ≻ q if and only if p(a) > 2/3 and q(a) < 1/3, which does not even satisfy transitivity in a
one-dimensional outcome space.
Let R denote the set of all continuous, convex, and symmetric preference relations over
∆. Despite the richness of R, preference relations therein admit a particularly nice rep-
resentation. A preference relation can be represented by a skew-symmetric and bilinear
(SSB) utility function φ : ∆×∆→ R if, for all p, q ∈ ∆,
p ≻ q if and only if φ(p, q) > 0.
Skew-symmetric requires that φ(p, q) = −φ(q, p) for all p, q ∈ ∆ and bilinearity that φ is
linear in both arguments. SSB utility was introduced by Fishburn (1982), who also gave
a complete characterization of preference relations representable by SSB functions.9 We
prove the following alternative characterization in Appendix F by reducing it to Fishburn’s
characterization.
Proposition 3. A preference relation ≻ can be represented by an SSB function if and only
if it satisfies continuity, convexity, and symmetry.
SSB functions are unique up to scalar multiplications. We therefore write φ ≡ φˆ if
and only if there is some α > 0 such that φ = α · φˆ, i.e., if φ and φˆ represent the same
8Fishburn’s original definition of symmetry requires p, q, and r to be linearly ordered (cf. Appendix F)
and is thus slightly weaker than symmetry as defined here. Since our notion of convexity is weaker than
Fishburn’s (1982) dominance axiom, this stronger formulation of symmetry is required for Proposition 3.
9Fishburn’s characterization uses continuity and symmetry conditions that are weaker than ours while our
convexity notion is weaker than his dominance axiom (see Appendix F for more details). Our axioms
are arguably more intuitive and match the axioms used in Proposition 2.
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preferences. We will also write ≻ ≡ φ if ≻ is represented by the SSB function φ. Every
preference relation ≻ ∈ R other than complete indifference can be associated with a unique
normalized SSB function on ∆×∆ whose largest positive value is equal to 1. Let Φ denote
the set of all SSB functions that are normalized in this way.10 Since all outcomes have
finite support, φ(p, q) can be written as a convex combination of the values of φ for pure
outcomes (Fishburn, 1984b). For this purpose, we identify every alternative a ∈ U with
the pure outcome that assigns probability 1 to a. Then, for all p, q ∈ ∆,
φ(p, q) =
∑
a,b∈U
p(a)q(b)φ(a, b).
We will often represent SSB functions restricted to ∆X for X ⊆ U as skew-symmetric
matrices in RX×X .
When requiring transitivity on top of continuity, convexity, and symmetry, the four
axioms characterize preference relations that can be represented by weighted linear (WL)
utility functions as introduced by Chew (1983).11 We will denote this set of preference
relations by RWL ⊂ R. When additionally requiring independence, then φ is separable,
i.e., φ(p, q) = u(p) − u(q), where u is a linear von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
representing ≻. The corresponding set of preference relations will be denoted by RvNM ⊂
RWL. For independently distributed outcomes (as considered in this paper), SSB utility
theory coincides with regret theory as introduced by Loomes and Sugden (1982) (see also
Loomes and Sugden, 1987; Blavatskyy, 2006).
Through the representation of ≻ ∈ R as a skew-symmetric matrix, it becomes apparent
that the Minimax Theorem implies the existence of maximal elements of ≻ on ∆X . This
was noted by Fishburn (1984b, Theorem 4) and already follows from Proposition 1.
6. Social Welfare Functions
In the remainder of this paper we deal with the problem of aggregating the preferences of
multiple agents into a collective preference relation. The set of agents is N = {1, . . . , n}
for some n ≥ 2. The preference relations of agents belong to some domain D ⊆ R. A
function R ∈ DN from the set of agents to the domain is a preference profile. We will write
preference profiles as tuples (≻1, . . . ,≻n) with indices in N . Given a preference profile R,
let Npq = {i ∈ N : p ≻i q} be the set of agents who strictly prefer p over q. Also, let
Ipq = N \ (Npq ∪ Nqp) be the set of agents who are indifferent between p and q. A social
10For vNM utility functions, this normalization boils down to the normalization of relative utilitarianism
(Dhillon and Mertens, 1999; Börgers and Choo, 2015).
11A WL function is characterized by a linear utility function and a linear and positive weight function.
An outcome p is preferred to another outcome q if the expected utility of p divided by its weight is
larger than the same quantity for q. Thus, WL functions are more general than linear utility functions,
as every linear utility function is equivalent to a WL function with constant weight function. See also
Fishburn (1983).
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welfare function (SWF) f : DN → R maps a preference profile to a collective preference
relation. When considering SWFs that may only map to collective preference relations in
RvNM , we will refer to SWFs with range RvNM .
Arrow (1951) initiated the study of SWFs that satisfy two desirable properties: Pareto
optimality and IIA. Pareto optimality prescribes that a unanimous preference of one out-
come over another in the individual preferences should be reflected in the collective pref-
erence. Formally, an SWF f satisfies Pareto optimality if, for all p, q ∈ ∆, R ∈ DN , and
f(R) = ≻,
p %i q for all i ∈ N implies p % q, and
if additionally p ≻i q for some i ∈ N then p ≻ q.
(Pareto Optimality)
The indifference part of Pareto optimality, which merely requires that p ∼i q for all i ∈ N
implies p ∼ q, is usually referred to as Pareto indifference.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives demands that collective preferences over some
feasible set of outcomes should only depend on the individual preferences over this set
(and not on the preferences over outcomes outside this set). In our framework, we will
assume that feasible sets are based on the availability of alternatives and are therefore of
the form ∆X for X ⊆ U .12 Formally, we say that an SWF f satisfies independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) if, for all R, Rˆ ∈ DN and X ⊆ U ,
R|∆X = Rˆ|∆X implies f(R)|∆X = f(Rˆ)|∆X . (IIA)
Any SWF that satisfies Pareto optimality and IIA will be called an Arrovian SWF.
Arrow has shown that, when no structure—such as convexity—is imposed on preference
relations and feasible sets, every Arrovian SWF is dictatorial, i.e., there is i ∈ N such
that for all p, q ∈ ∆, R ∈ DN , and f(R) = ≻, p ≻i q implies p ≻ q. Dictatorships are
examples of SWFs that are extremely biased towards one agent. In many applications, any
differentiation between agents is unacceptable and all agents should be treated equally.
This property is known as anonymity. We denote by ΠN the set of all permutations on N .
For pi ∈ ΠN and a preference profile R ∈ DN , Rpi = R ◦ pi is the preference profile where
agents are renamed according to pi. Then, an SWF f satisfies anonymity if, for all R ∈ DN
and pi ∈ ΠN ,
f(R) = f(Rpi). (Anonymity)
Anonymity is obviously a stronger requirement than non-dictatorship.
12Strengthening IIA by allowing all convex subsets of ∆ to be feasible completely ignores the structure
of ∆ as the convex hull of U and is too demanding when paired with our other axioms. Since pair-
wise utilitarianism violates this strong notion of IIA, Theorem 2 would turn into an impossibility.
Our notion of IIA where only faces of ∆ are feasible was also used in the impossibility theorem by
Kalai and Schmeidler (1977b) and, in an even weaker form, in the characterization of relative utilitari-
anism by Dhillon and Mertens (1999); see Footnote 13.
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Two straightforward aggregation rules that satisfy Pareto optimality, IIA, and anonymity
are majority rule (p ≻ q if and only if |Npq| > |Nqp|) and Pareto rule (p ≻ q if and only if
|Npq| > 0 and Nqp = ∅). However, both rules do not constitute well-defined SWFs because
they do not map to R. While majority rule may not even produce maximal elements
(Zeckhauser, 1969), Pareto rule violates continuity and convexity.
A natural subclass of SWFs can be defined by computing the weighted sum of the
normalized individual utility representations. An SWF is called affine utilitarian if and
only if there are weights w1, . . . , wn ∈ R such that for all R ∈ DN and (φi)i∈N ∈ ΦN with
(φi)i∈N ≡ R,
f(R) ≡
∑
i∈N
wiφi. (Affine Utilitarianism)
Affine utilitarian SWFs satisfy Pareto indifference. This still allows for constant SWFs
(by setting all weights to 0) or dictatorial SWFs (by setting all weights but one to 0).
When requiring that all weights are positive, these SWFs are ruled out and all resulting
SWFs satisfy Pareto optimality. The unique anonymous and affine utilitarian SWF with
positive weights is defined by setting all weights to 1 and will simply be referred to as
the utilitarian SWF. On the domain of vNM preferences, the utilitarian SWF coincides
with relative utilitarianism as introduced by Dhillon and Mertens (1999). The utilitarian
SWF violates IIA on domain RvNM . For example, for two agents and three alternatives,
consider a preference profile where the first agent assigns normalized utilities 1, 0, and
0 to the alternatives and the second agent assigns 1/3, 1, and 0. Then, when deriving
the collective preferences by employing utilitarianism, the first alternative is preferred to
the second alternative. If instead the utility of the first agent for the second alternative
was 1/2, the latter would be collectively preferred to the first alternative, even though the
individual preferences over those two alternatives have not changed. Consequently, the
utilitarian SWF also violates IIA on the full domain R.13
7. Characterization of the Domain
When restricting attention to SWFs with range RvNM , it is known that anonymous Arro-
vian aggregation on the full domain R is impossible because it is already impossible in the
subdomain of vNM preferences (see Appendix A). On the other hand, interesting possibil-
ities emerge in restricted domains such as in that of dichotomous vNM preferences Rdich
where each agent can only assign two different vNM utility values, say, 0 and 1 (Inada,
1969). In Theorem 3 (Appendix D), we show that anonymous Arrovian aggregation of
vNM preferences is only possible in subdomains of Rdich . In such domains, every affine
13Dhillon and Mertens introduced a weakening of IIA called independence of redundant alternatives, which
only considers feasible sets for which every infeasible outcome is unanimously indifferent to some feasible
outcome, and show that this condition is satisfied by the utilitarian SWF on domain RvNM . However,
it can be shown that this is no longer the case when considering the full domain R.
14
utilitarian SWF satisfies IIA since for every X ⊆ U , the individual preferences over all
outcomes in ∆X only depend on which alternatives in X receive utility 1. When all in-
dividual weights are positive, these SWFs furthermore satisfy Pareto optimality and thus
constitute a natural class of Arrovian SWFs. The utilitarian SWF corresponds to approval
voting and ranks pure outcomes by the number of approvals they receive from the agents
(see, e.g., Brams and Fishburn, 2007). This ranking is identical to majority rule, which
happens to be transitive for dichotomous preferences, and is extended to all outcomes by
comparing expected utilities. In Theorem 4 (Appendix D), we prove that this SWF is in
fact the only anonymous Arrovian SWF with range RvNM when D ⊆ Rdich and |U| ≥ 4.14
The goal of this section is to characterize the unique inclusion-maximal domain D ⊆ R
for which anonymous Arrovian SWFs exist. To this end, we need to assume that D satisfies
four richness conditions. First, we require that it is neutral in the sense that it is not biased
towards certain alternatives. For pi ∈ ΠU and p ∈ ∆, let ppi ∈ ∆ such that ppi(pi(a)) = p(a)
for all a ∈ U . Then, for ≻ ∈ R, we define ≻pi such that ppi ≻pi qpi if and only if p ≻ q for
all p, q ∈ ∆. It is assumed that
≻ ∈ D if and only if ≻pi ∈ D for all pi ∈ ΠU and ≻ ∈ D. (R1)
Second, we require that it is possible to be completely indifferent, i.e.,
∅ ∈ D. (R2)
Third, it should also be possible for agents to declare completely opposed preferences. For
≻ ∈ D, ≻−1 is the inverse of ≻, i.e., p ≻−1 q if and only if q ≻ p for all p, q ∈ ∆. Then,
≻ ∈ D implies ≻−1 ∈ D for all ≻ ∈ R. (R3)
Note that this condition is not implied by the previous neutrality condition because it allows
the inversion of preferences over all outcomes, not only over pure outcomes. Finally, we
demand that for every preference relation in D and every set of up to four pure outcomes,
there is a relation in D with the same preferences over pure outcomes such that these
outcomes are all preferred to a fifth pure outcome.
for all ≻ˆ ∈ D and X ⊆ U , |X| ≤ 4, there is ≻ ∈ D and a ∈ U such that ≻|X = ≻ˆ|X and
x ≻ a for all x ∈ X.
(R4)
Any domain D ⊆ R that satisfies R1, R2, R3, and R4 is called rich. Note that any rich
domain allows for arbitrary transitive preferences over up to five pure outcomes.
14Maniquet and Mongin (2015) show a similar statement in the classic non-convex social choice setting.
Since they only consider pure outcomes, their notions of Pareto optimality and IIA are weaker than ours.
However, the consequence of their statement is also weaker because it only implies that pure outcomes
are ranked according to their approval scores.
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RvNM
WL
PC
dich.
Figure 1: Venn diagram showing the inclusion relationships between preference domains.
The intersection of RvNM and RPC (pairwise comparison) contains exactly Rdich .
The intersection of RWL (weighted linear utility) and RPC contains exactly the
domain of PC preferences based on trichotomous weak orders (see Figure 2 for an
example). An example of a preference relation in RPC \RWL is given in Figure 3.
Theorem 1 shows thatRPC is the unique inclusion-maximal rich domain for which
anonymous Arrovian aggregation is possible within R. This, for example, implies
impossibilities for RWL and RvNM .
A rich domain that will turn out to be important for our characterization is defined as
follows. We say that φ ∈ Φ is based on pairwise comparisons if φ(a, b) ∈ {−1, 0, 1} for
all a, b ∈ U and denote the set of SSB functions that are based on pairwise comparisons
by ΦPC ⊂ Φ and the corresponding set of preference relations by RPC = {≻ ∈ R : ≻ ≡
φ for some φ ∈ ΦPC }. RPC contains Rdich (see Figure 1). Other rich domains include
R, RWL, RvNM , and the subset of RPC in which all preferences over pure outcomes are
transitive.
Anonymous Arrovian aggregation is only possible on rich subdomains of RPC .
Theorem 1. Let f be an anonymous Arrovian SWF on some rich domain D with |U| ≥ 4.
Then, D ⊆ RPC .
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix B.
PC preferences are quite natural and can be seen as the canonical SSB representation
consistent with a given ordinal preference relation over alternatives. For a preference
relation ≻ ∈ RPC and two outcomes p, q ∈ ∆ we have that
p ≻ q if and only if
∑
a,b : a≻b
p(a) · q(b) >
∑
a,b : a≻b
q(a) · p(b).
If p and q are interpreted as independent lotteries, p is preferred to q if and only if p is more
likely to return a more preferred alternative than q. Alternatively, the terms in the inequal-
ity above can be associated with the probability of ex ante regret. Then, p is preferred to q
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
ab
c

 ≡ φ =
a b c( )0 1 1 a
−1 0 1 b
−1 −1 0 c
a
b
c
Figure 2: Illustration of preferences based on pairwise comparisons for three alternatives
when preferences over pure outcomes are given by the transitive relation a ≻
b ≻ c. The left-hand side shows the preference relation and the SSB function
and the right-hand side the Marschak-Machina probability triangle. The arrows
represent normal vectors to the indifference curves (pointing towards the lower
contour set). Each indifference curve separates the corresponding upper and
lower contour set.
if its choice results in less ex ante regret. Since PC preferences are completely determined
by preferences over pure outcomes and transitive preferences over pure outcomes can be
conveniently represented by weak rankings, we will compactly represent PC preferences
over some set of alternatives by putting the weak ranking of these alternatives in brackets
(see Figures 2 and 3 for examples).
PC preferences have previously been considered in decision theory (Blyth, 1972; Packard,
1982; Blavatskyy, 2006). Packard (1982) calls them the rule of expected dominance and
Blavatskyy (2006) refers to them as a preference for the most probable winner. Aziz et al.
(2015, 2018) and Brandl et al. (2019) have studied Pareto efficiency, strategyproofness,
and related properties with respect to these preferences. Blavatskyy (2006) gives an ax-
iomatic characterization of PC preferences using the SSB axioms (continuity, convexity,
and symmetry), and an additional axiom called fanning-in, which essentially prescribes
that indifference curves are not parallel, but fanning in at a certain rate (see Figure 2).
As a corollary of Theorem 1, fanning-in is implied by Fishburn’s SSB axioms and Arrow’s
axioms. Blavatskyy cites extensive experimental evidence for the fanning-in of indifference
curves.
Figure 2 illustrates PC preferences for three transitively ordered pure outcomes.15 When
there are at least four alternatives, PC preferences can be cyclic even when preferences over
pure outcomes are transitive. This phenomenon, known as the Steinhaus-Trybula paradox,
15For three alternatives, PC preferences as depicted in Figure 2 can be represented by a WL function with
utility function u(a) = u(b) = 1 and u(c) = 0 and weight function w(a) = 0 and w(b) = w(c) = 1.
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

a
b
c
d

 ≡ φ =
a b c d



0 1 1 1 a
−1 0 1 1 b
−1 −1 0 1 c
−1 −1 −1 0 d
a b c d
p 0 0 1 0
q 2/5 0 0 3/5
r 0 3/5 0 2/5
Figure 3: Illustration of preferences based on pairwise comparisons for four alternatives
when preferences over pure outcomes are given by the transitive relation a ≻ b ≻
c ≻ d. The left-hand side shows the preference relation and the SSB function.
The preferences between the three outcomes p, q, and r, defined in the table on
the right-hand side, are cyclic: φ(p, q) = 3/5−2/5 = 1/5 > 0, φ(q, r) = 2/5−(3/5)2 =
1/25 > 0, and φ(r, p) = 3/5− 2/5 = 1/5 > 0. Hence, p ≻ q ≻ r ≻ p.
is illustrated in Figure 3 (see, e.g., Steinhaus and Trybula, 1959; Blyth, 1972; Packard, 1982;
Rubinstein and Segal, 2012; Butler and Pogrebna, 2018). Butler and Pogrebna (2018)
have conducted an extensive experimental study of the Steinhaus-Trybula paradox and
found significant evidence for PC preferences.
8. Characterization of the Social Welfare Function
Theorem 1 has established that anonymous Arrovian aggregation is only possible if in-
dividual preferences are based on pairwise comparisons, i.e., D ⊆ RPC . This raises the
question which SWFs (if any) are Arrovian on D.
It turns out that for any ≻ ∈ D, ≻ ≡ φ ∈ Φ, and X ⊆ U , ≻|∆X uniquely determines
φ|X (not only up to a positive scalar). Hence, affine utilitarian SWFs satisfy IIA. Since
any affine utilitarian SWF with positive weights furthermore satisfies Pareto optimality,
these SWFs are Arrovian. Our next theorem shows that these are indeed the only Arrovian
SWFs. More precisely, we show that SWFs on domain D satisfy Pareto indifference and
IIA if and only if they are affine utilitarian. Affine utilitarian SWFs may assign negative or
null weights to agents. As mentioned in Section 6, this, for example, allows for dictatorial
SWFs where the collective preferences are identical to the preference relation of one pre-
determined agent. However, when assuming full Pareto optimality, the weights assigned to
these SSB functions have to be positive, which rules out dictatorial SWFs.
Theorem 2. Let f be an Arrovian SWF on some rich domain D ⊆ RPC with |U| ≥ 5.
Then, f is affine utilitarian with positive weights.
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Appendix C.
On subdomains of RPC , affine utilitarianism with positive weights admits an intuitive
probabilistic interpretation: in order to compare two lotteries p and q, randomly sample
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φ =
a b c( )0 1 −1 a
−1 0 1 b
1 −1 0 c
a
b
c
•
Figure 4: Illustration of collective preferences returned by the unique anonymous Arrovian
SWF in the case of Condorcet’s paradox. The left-hand side shows the collective
SSB function and the right-hand side the Marschak-Machina probability triangle.
The arrows represent normal vectors to the indifference curves (pointing towards
the lower contour set). Each indifference curve separates the corresponding upper
and lower contour set. The unique most preferred outcome is 1/3 a+ 1/3 b+ 1/3 c.
a pure outcome a from p, a pure outcome b from q, and an agent i with probabilities
proportional to the agents’ weights. Then, p is collectively preferred to q if and only if the
probability that agent i prefers a to b is greater than the probability that he prefers b to a.
Theorem 2 can be seen as a multi-profile version of Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation The-
orem (see Section 2) for SSB preferences, where IIA allows us to connect weights across
different profiles. When furthermore assuming anonymity, the weights of all SSB functions
have to be identical and we obtain the following complete characterization.
Corollary 1. Let |U| ≥ 5 and D be a rich domain. An anonymous SWF is Arrovian if
and only if it is the utilitarian SWF and D ⊆ RPC .
We refer to the utilitarian SWF on PC preferences as pairwise utilitarianism. Pairwise
utilitarianism is computationally tractable: two outcomes can be compared by straight-
forward matrix-vector multiplications while a maximal outcome can be found using linear
programming. For illustrative purposes, consider the classic Condorcet preference profile
R = (

ab
c

 ,

bc
a

 ,

ca
b

) ≡ (

 0 1 1−1 0 1
−1 −1 0

 ,

0 −1 −11 0 1
1 −1 0

 ,

 0 1 −1−1 0 −1
1 1 0

) = (φ1, φ2, φ3).
Note that the pairwise majority relation is cyclic, since there are majorities for a over b, b
over c, and c over a. The unique anonymous Arrovian SWF f aggregates preferences by
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adding the individual utility representations, i.e.,
f(R) ≡
∑
i∈N
φi =

 0 1 −1−1 0 1
1 −1 0

 .
Figure 4 shows the collective preference relation represented by this matrix. The unique
most preferred outcome is 1/3 a+ 1/3 b+ 1/3 c.16
9. Discussion
Our results challenge the traditional—transitive—way of thinking about individual and
collective preferences, which has been largely influenced by the pervasiveness of scores
and grades. While our theorems do hold for transitive individual preferences over pure
outcomes, the preference domain we characterize does admit preference cycles over mixed
outcomes. Pareto optimality then immediately implies the same for collective preferences.
Even though the collective preference relation we characterize does not provide a ranking
of all possible outcomes, it nevertheless allows for the comparison of arbitrary pairs of
outcomes and identifies maximal (and minimal) elements in each feasible set of outcomes.17
Some readers may be concerned by, say, deriving the decisions of a government from an
intransitive collective preference relation. We believe that this concern is largely based on
the common fallacy of equating transitivity with rationality. Transitivity certainly appears
to be a desirable property of preference relations. However, in notoriously difficult settings
such as social choice, it can be unnecessarily restrictive: unnecessary because basic princi-
ples of rational choice (such as Propositions 1 and 2) hold without making this assumption
and restrictive because collective choice is impossible when insisting on transitivity. Arrow’s
theorem implies that every Pareto optimal social choice function (i) cannot be rationalized
by a transitive collective preference relation or (ii) takes into account irrelevant information
(by violations of IIA). Consider, for example, Borda’s voting rule which assigns equidistant
scores to alternatives based on the agents’ individual rankings and returns the alternatives
with maximal accumulated score. Sen (1977, pp. 78f) provides an illuminating discussion
of two different interpretations of Borda’s rule for variable feasible sets that highlight the
tension between (transitive) rationalizability and IIA. In a choice-theoretic context, IIA
demands that the choice set only depends on preferences over elements contained in the
16This outcome represents a somewhat unusual unique maximal element because it is not strictly preferred
to any of the other outcomes. This is due to the contrived nature of the example and only happens if
the support of a maximal outcome contains all alternatives. Also, in this example, collective preferences
happen to be PC preferences, which clearly is not the case in general.
17Bernheim and Rangel (2009) have recently also put forward a relaxed—intransitive—notion of welfare
and defended it as “a viable welfare criterion” because it guarantees the existence of maximal elements
for finite sets. In fact, Bernheim and Rangel write that “to conduct useful welfare analysis, one does
not require transitivity” (see also Bernheim, 2009).
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feasible set, and rationalizability requires that all choices can be rationalized by a single
collective preference relation ranging over all alternatives in the universe. Now, the broad
Borda rule first assigns Borda scores to all alternatives in the universe and then returns the
alternatives with maximal scores within the feasible set. By contrast, the narrow Borda
rule directly assigns Borda scores to alternatives in the feasible set and then returns those
with maximal score. The broad Borda rule can be rationalized by a transitive collective
preference relation (the ranking of all alternatives by their Borda score), but clearly violates
IIA while the narrow Borda rule satisfies IIA, but cannot be rationalized by any binary
preference relation (it violates contraction consistency). ArrowâĂŹs theorem shows that
this tradeoff concerns all Pareto optimal social choice functions. Moreover, Sen observed
that transitivity rationalizability can be replaced with contraction consistency in Arrow’s
theorem and many related results. While voters could justifiably complain that, under the
broad Borda rule, the social choice from feasible set {a, b, c} depends on their preferences
over other unrelated alternatives, say, d or e (a violation of IIA), they could be similarly
concerned about the narrow Borda rule, under which it is possible that alternative {a}
is chosen from {a, b, c} but not from {a, b}. Both failures are troubling: the lack of IIA
because seemingly irrelevant information is taken into account for the social choice, and
the lack of contraction because introducing or removing, say, clearly inferior alternatives
can influence the social choice.
Within the setting of convex outcome sets as described in our paper, affine utilitarian
social choice functions on the domain of PC preferences simultaneously satisfy IIA and
rationalizability by a binary preference relation (and thus contraction) as well as Pareto
optimality. If one takes offense at intransitivities, these functions can also be interpreted as
mappings from individual choice functions (which may already be aggregates of individual
opinions) to a collective choice function. A compelling opinion on transitivity, which
matches the narrative of our paper, is expressed in the following quote by decision theorist
Peter C. Fishburn:
Transitivity is obviously a great practical convenience and a nice thing to have
for mathematical purposes, but long ago this author ceased to understand why
it should be a cornerstone of normative decision theory. [. . . ] The presence
of intransitive preferences complicates matters [. . . ] however, it is not cause
enough to reject intransitivity. An analogous rejection of non-Euclidean geom-
etry in physics would have kept the familiar and simpler Newtonian mechanics
in place, but that was not to be. Indeed, intransitivity challenges us to consider
more flexible models that retain as much simplicity and elegance as circum-
stances allow. It challenges old ways of analyzing decisions and suggests new
possibilities. (Fishburn, 1991, pp. 115–117)
Theorem 2, the main result of this paper, can be viewed as an intermediary between
Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation Theorem and Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem: it uses Ar-
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row’s axioms to derive Harsanyi’s utilitarian consequence. Clearly, the form of utilitarian-
ism characterized in Theorem 2 is rather restrictive as, due to Theorem 1, it does not allow
for intensities of individual preferences.18 In fact, it is no more “utilitarian” than approval
voting or Borda’s rule, which are also based on the summation of scores in purely ordinal
contexts. In contrast to Borda’s rule, however, pairwise utilitarianism respects majority
rule on pure outcomes and thereby reconciles Borda’s and Condorcet’s seemingly conflict-
ing views on preference aggregation (see, e.g., Black, 1958; Young, 1988, 1995). While
Theorem 1 shows that Arrow’s axioms rule out intensities of individual preferences over
pure outcomes, Theorem 2 implies that intensities of collective preferences are required.
To conclude, we would like to highlight a remarkable quote from Kenneth J. Arrow’s
influential monograph, which draws the reader’s attention precisely to the avenue pursued
in this paper.
It seems that the essential point is, and this is of general bearing, that, if
conceptually we imagine a choice being made between two alternatives, we
cannot exclude any probability distribution over those two choices as a possible
alternative. The precise shape of a formulation of rationality which takes the
last point into account or the consequences of such a reformulation on the
theory of choice in general or the theory of social choice in particular cannot be
foreseen; but it is at least a possibility, to which attention should be drawn, that
the paradox to be discussed below might be resolved by such a broader concept
of rationality [. . . ] Many writers have felt that the assumption of rationality, in
the sense of a one-dimensional ordering of all possible alternatives, is absolutely
necessary for economic theorizing [. . . ] There seems to be no logical necessity
for this viewpoint; we could just as well build up our economic theory on other
assumptions as to the structure of choice functions if the facts seemed to call
for it. (Arrow, 1951, pp. 20–21)
10. Remarks
This section contains a number of technical remarks concerning Theorems 1 and 2.
Remark 1 (Transitivity). When requiring transitivity of individual preferences over
all outcomes, we immediately obtain an impossibility because |U| ≥ 4 and R4 imply that
18One may even question whether this form of preference aggregation really qualifies as utilitarianism.
However, in a similar vein, one could also question whether Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation Theorem or
Dhillon and Mertens’ relative utilitarianism are concerned with cardinal utilitarianism because vNM
utilities are merely a compact representation of ordinal preferences over lotteries (see, e.g., Weymark,
1991; Fleurbaey et al., 2008; Fleurbaey and Mongin, 2016; Mongin and Pivato, 2016, for a discussion of
this issue in the context of the so-called Harsanyi-Sen debate). Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947,
p. 16) themselves warn against cardinal interpretations of their utility theory (see also “Fallacy 3” by
Luce and Raiffa (1957, p. 32) and Fishburn (1989)).
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we have to admit a strict ranking of four pure outcomes. According to Theorem 1, these
preferences are extended to all outcomes using the PC extension. The example given
in Figure 3 shows that these preferences violate transitivity. Hence, we also have the
impossibility of anonymous Arrovian aggregation of WL preferences (and thereby of vNM
preferences), even when collective preferences need not be transitive.19
Remark 2 (Anonymity). Theorem 1 does not hold without assuming anonymity. Let
U = {a, b, c, d}, N = {1, 2, 3},
φ =


0 1 1 1 + ε
−1 0 1 1
−1 −1 0 1
−(1 + ε) −1 −1 0


for some ε ∈ (0, 1/4), and D ≡ ΦPC ∪ {φpi : pi ∈ ΠU}. D satisfies our richness assumptions
and the SWF f : D → R, f(R) ≡ 2φ1 + 3φ2 + 4φ3 satisfies Pareto optimality and IIA, but
violates anonymity. Note that f is not dictatorial. Hence, Theorem 1 does not hold when
weakening anonymity to non-dictatorship.
Remark 3 (Tightness of Bounds). Theorem 1 does not hold if |U| < 4, which is
the same bound as for the result by Kalai and Schmeidler (1977a). This stems from the
fact that for |U| = 3, IIA only has consequences for feasible sets of the form ∆{a,b} for
some a, b ∈ U . For every possible preference between a and b, there is exactly one SSB
preference relation on ∆{a,b} consistent with it. Hence, IIA only has consequences for
the collective preferences over pure outcomes. However, even for three alternatives, the
domains of preferences satisfying R1, R2, and R3 which allow for anonymous Arrovian
aggregation are severely restricted. In particular, Lemmas 2 to 4 and the cases (i) and (iv)
of Lemma 5 still hold. Any such domain contains exactly one SSB function φ for every
strict order over U , which takes the form
φ =

 0 1 λ−1 0 1
−λ −1 0


for some λ ∈ R>0 that is fixed across all strict orders. For 1 < λ < 1 + 1/n, the utilitarian
SWF constitutes an Arrovian SWF on the corresponding domain.
Theorem 2 does not hold if |U| < 5. Let U = {a, b, c, d}, D = RPC ,
φˆ =


0 1 0 0
−1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 −1 0

 , and Rˆ = (


a
b
c
d

 ,


a
b
c
d

 ,


c
d
a
b

 ,


d
c
a
b

 , . . . )
19When collective preferences have to be transitive as well, this impossibility directly follows from Arrow’s
theorem by only considering pure outcomes. Pareto optimality and IIA only become weaker while
non-dictatorship is strengthened (dictators only need to be able to dictate strict preferences over pure
outcomes). The latter is implied by anonymity.
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such that every preference relation in D \ {∅} appears exactly once in (Rˆi)i∈N\{1,2,3,4}.
Then, Pareto optimality has no implications for Rˆ. Let f : DN → R be the utilitarian
SWF except that f(Rˆ) ≡ φˆ. f satisfies Pareto optimality and IIA. The proof of Theorem 2
fails at Lemma 8.
Remark 4 (SWFs with Range D). When defining SWFs by requiring that collective
preferences have to belong to the same domain as individual preferences, one obtains an
impossibility. Theorem 1 only becomes weaker if we restrict the range of SWFs. Hence,
both individual and collective preferences have to belong to RPC and Theorem 2 implies
that any Arrovian SWF is affine utilitarian with positive weights. However when letting
φ1 =

 0 1 1−1 0 0
−1 0 0

 and φ2 =

 0 0 10 0 1
−1 −1 0

 ,
then φ1, φ2 ∈ ΦPC while there is no w1, w2 ∈ R>0 such that w1φ1 +w2φ2 ∈ ΦPC . Since φ1
and φ2 represent dichotomous preference relations, Theorem 4 also turns into an impossi-
bility.
Remark 5 (More General Preference Relations). Our results could be strengthened
by making even less assumptions about individual and collective preferences. Whether
symmetry is required for Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 is open. A more drastic generalization
would only require the existence of maximal elements in all feasible sets with respect to
the collective preference relation. Such a generalization of Theorem 1 does not hold. Con-
sider the domain of individual preferences containing all transitive and complete relations.
Pareto rule (see Section 6) is anonymous and Arrovian and always returns a relation that
permits maximal elements. Hence, Theorem 2 does not hold either. For the full domain of
individual preferences that admit maximal elements in all feasible sets, Pareto optimality
alone can result in collective preferences that do not admit a maximal element.
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APPENDIX
A. Arrovian Impossibilities for vNM Preferences
As mentioned in Section 2, there are a number of Arrovian impossibilities when prefer-
ences over lotteries satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) axioms and thus can be
represented by assigning cardinal utilities to alternatives such that lotteries are compared
based on the expected utility they produce. We believe that a detailed comparison of
these results which have appeared in different branches of social choice theory and welfare
economics is in order.
The literature on economic domains uses a framework very similar to the one studied in
this paper (see Le Breton and Weymark, 2011). A key question is whether Arrow’s impos-
sibility remains intact if the domain of admissible preference profiles is subject to certain
structural restrictions. Many results in this area rely on the so-called local approach due to
Kalai et al. (1979), who proposed a simple domain condition that is sufficient for Arrow’s
impossibility. Le Breton (1986) has shown that this condition is satisfied by the domain of
vNM preferences, which implies Arrow’s impossibility (see also Le Breton and Weymark
(2011, p. 214)). The corresponding IIA condition is defined for arbitrary pairs of lotteries,
or—equivalently—arbitrary feasible sets of size two (which implies IIA for arbitrary feasi-
ble sets of lotteries). In view of the structure of the set of lotteries, weaker IIA conditions
(for example, restricted to convex feasible sets) seem natural.
Sen (1970) has initiated the study of so-called social welfare functionals (SWFLs), which
map a profile of cardinal utilities to a transitive and complete collective preference relation
(see also d’Aspremont and Gevers, 2002). The definitions of Pareto optimality and IIA can
be straightforwardly extended to SWFLs. Note, however, that IIA takes into account the
absolute values of utilities (rather than only ordinal comparisons between these values).
This allows for Pareto optimal SWFLs that satisfy IIA, for example by adding individual
utilities (utilitarianism).
vNM utilities are invariant under positive affine transformations. To account for this,
Sen (1970) introduced the axiom of cardinality and non-comparability, which prescribes
that collective preferences returned by the SWFL are invariant under positive affine trans-
formations of the individual utility functions. However, this assumption effectively turns
the problem into a problem of ordinal preference aggregation because the utility values
assigned to two different alternatives in two different utility profiles can be made identical
across profiles by applying a positive affine transformation. Hence, IIA implies an ordinal
version of IIA which only takes into account the ordinal comparisons between utility values
and Arrow’s original theorem holds (Sen, 1970, Theorem 8*2).
There are two ways to interpret this result. First, one can view the set of alternatives as
the set consisting of only degenerate lotteries. This leads to weak notions of Pareto optimal-
ity and IIA because they are only concerned with degenerate lotteries. Non-dictatorship,
on the other hand, becomes much stronger because a dictator can only enforce his (strict)
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preferences over degenerate lotteries, rather than all lotteries. Alternatively, one can define
the set of alternatives as the set of all lotteries. This gives rise to stronger notions of Pareto
optimality and IIA based on pairs of lotteries, rather than pairs of degenerate lotteries. In
this model, non-dictatorship is defined by excluding agents who can enforce their (strict)
preferences over lotteries. Like Arrow’s theorem, Sen’s result assumes an unrestricted do-
main of preferences (or ordinal utilities, respectively). Expected utility functions over a set
of lotteries, however, are subject to certain structural constraints (described by the vNM
axioms independence and continuity). This gap is filled by Mongin (1994, Proposition 3),
who has shown that Sen’s result still holds when the set of alternatives is a convex subset
of some vector space with mixture-preserving (i.e., affine) utility functions, which includes
the domain of lotteries over some finite set of alternatives as a special case.20 The Pareto
condition used by Mongin is identical to the one used in his paper and therefore slightly
stronger than the one used by Arrow, Sen, and Le Breton.
A very strong impossibility for vNM preferences was given by Kalai and Schmeidler
(1977b) (and later improved by Hylland (1980)). Kalai and Schmeidler consider “cardinal”
preference relations represented by equivalence classes of utility functions that can be
transformed into each other using positive affine transformations and cardinal social welfare
functions, which map a profile of cardinal preference relations to a collective cardinal
preference relation. The set of alternatives is defined as the set of degenerate lotteries like
in the first interpretation of Sen’s result above. Preferences over lotteries are implicit in
each equivalence class of utility functions. When interpreted in our ordinal framework, they
prove an Arrovian impossibility when individual and collective preferences over lotteries
are subject to the vNM axioms and there are at least four alternatives. In contrast to the
results by Le Breton, Sen, and Mongin, IIA is only required for feasible sets given by the
convex combination of degenerate lotteries and non-dictatorship only rules out projections.
The theorem thus uses weaker notions of Pareto optimality, IIA, and non-dictatorship at
the expense of also requiring the vNM axioms for the collective preference relation. When
replacing non-dictatorship with anonymity, our Theorem 1 implies a similar impossibility,
even without requiring collective preferences to be transitive (see Remark 1). We use
Kalai and Schmeidler’s weak IIA notion, but Mongin’s strong notion of Pareto optimality.
B. Characterization of the Domain
We start by showing that every continuous relation satisfies a weaker notion of continuity
known as Archimedean continuity. This statement will also be used in Appendices E and
F. A preference relation ≻ satisfies Archimedean continuity if for all p, q, r ∈ ∆,
p ≻ q ≻ r implies pλr ∼ q for some λ ∈ (0, 1). (Archimedean continuity)
20The vector space is required to be at least of dimension 2, which corresponds to the set of lotteries over
at least three degenerate lotteries.
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It is well-known that continuity implies Archimedean continuity (see, e.g., Karni, 2007).
We give a proof for completeness below.
Lemma 1. If a preference relation ≻ satisfies continuity, then it satisfies Archimedean
continuity.
Proof. Let ≻ be a preference relation satisfying continuity, p, q, r ∈ ∆ such that p ≻ q ≻ r,
and λ∗ = supλ∈[0,1]{q ≻ pλr}. Since q ≻ r, λ
∗ is well defined. Continuity of ≻ implies
that L(q) and U(q) are open and hence, L(q) ∩ [p, r] and U(q) ∩ [p, r] are open in [p, r]. If
q ≻ pλ∗r, then L(q) ∩ [p, r] is not open in [p, r], since pλr % q for all λ > λ∗, which is a
contradiction. If pλ∗r ≻ q, then U(q)∩ [p, r] is not open in [p, r], since, by definition of λ∗,
every open neighborhood of pλ∗r in [p, r] contains pλr for some λ < λ∗ such that q ≻ pλr.
This is again a contradiction. Hence, q ∼ pλ∗r.
Two vNM preference relations with the same symmetric part have to be equal up to
orientation, since any two linear functions representing them have to have the same null
space. Fishburn and Gehrlein (1987, Theorem 2) have shown that this statement extends
to SSB preference relations, which will be useful in subsequent proofs.21
Lemma 2 (Fishburn and Gehrlein, 1987). Let ≻, ≻ˆ ∈ R such that ∼ ⊆ ∼ˆ. Then, ≻ˆ ∈
{≻,≻−1, ∅}.
The next lemma is reminiscent of what is known as the field expansion lemma in tra-
ditional proofs of Arrow’s theorem (see, e.g. Sen, 1986).22 Let f : DN → R be an SWF,
G,H ⊆ N , and a, b ∈ U . We say that (G,H) is decisive for a against b, denoted by
a DG,H b, if, for all R ∈ DN , a ≻i b for all i ∈ G, a ∼i b for all i ∈ H, and b ≻i a for all
i ∈ N \ (G ∪H) implies a ≻ b. Hence, DG,H is a relation on U .
Lemma 3. Let f be an Arrovian SWF on some rich domain D with |U| ≥ 3, G,H ⊆ N ,
and a, b ∈ U . Then, a DG,H b implies that DG,H = U × U .
Proof. First we show that a DG,H x and b DG,H x for all x ∈ U \ {a, b}. To this end, let
x ∈ U \ {a, b} and ≻x ∈ D be a preference relation such that a ≻x b ≻x x and a ≻x x,
which exists by richness assumption R4 (cf. Section 6). Consider the preference profile
R = (≻x, . . . ,≻x︸ ︷︷ ︸
G
, ∅, . . . , ∅︸ ︷︷ ︸
H
,≻−1x , . . . ,≻
−1
x ),
which exists by R2 and R3. Since ≻x ∩ ≻−1x = ∅, it follows from Pareto indifference and
Lemma 2 that ≻ = f(R) ∈ {≻x,≻−1x , ∅}. Since a DG,H b, ≻ = ≻x remains as the only
possibility. Hence, a ≻ x and b ≻ x. By IIA, it follows that a DG,H x and b DG,H x.
21Brandl (2018, Lemma 8.8) shows that Lemma 2 even holds when ≻ and ≻ˆ are only required to satisfy
Archimedean continuity and Fishburn’s (1982) dominance axiom.
22In contrast to Lemma 3, the consequence of the original field expansion lemma uses a stronger notion of
decisiveness.
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Repeated application of the second statement implies that DG,H is a complete relation.
To show that DG,H is symmetric, let x, y, z ∈ U such that x DG,H y. The first part of the
statement implies that x DG,H z. Two applications of the second part of the statement
yield z DG,H y and y DG,H x. Hence, DG,H = U × U .
Now we show that anonymous Arrovian aggregation is only possible on rich domains
in which preferences over outcomes are completely determined by preferences over pure
outcomes.
Lemma 4. Let f be an anonymous Arrovian SWF on some rich domain D with |U| ≥ 3.
Then, ≻|A = ≻ˆ|A implies ≻|∆A = ≻ˆ|∆A for all ≻, ≻ˆ ∈ D and A ⊆ U .
Proof. Let ≻0, ≻ˆ0 ∈ D and A ⊆ U such that ≻0|A = ≻ˆ0|A. Consider the preference profile
R = (≻0, ≻ˆ
−1
0 , ∅, . . . , ∅),
which exists by R2 and R3. Assume that there are a, b ∈ A such that a ≻0 b and define
R¯ = R(12) to be identical to R except that the preferences of agents 1 and 2 are exchanged.
Anonymity of f implies that ≻¯ = f(R¯) = f(R) = ≻. Assume for contradiction that
a ≻ b. Then, by IIA, ({1}, N \ {1, 2}) is decisive for a against b. Lemma 3 implies that
({1}, N \ {1, 2}) is also decisive for b against a. Hence b ≻¯ a, which contradicts ≻¯ = ≻.
Hence, we get that a ∼ b for all a, b ∈ A such that a ≻ˆ0 b. For a, b ∈ A such that a ∼0 b
and a ∼ˆ0 b, it follows from Pareto indifference that a ∼ b. Hence, a ∼ b for all a, b ∈ A.
Since by convexity of ≻, indifference sets are convex, we get that ≻|∆A = ∅. If ≻0|∆A 6=
≻ˆ0|∆A , there are p, q ∈ ∆A such that p ≻0 q and not p ≻ˆ0 q, i.e., p %ˆ
−1
0 q. The strict
part of Pareto optimality of f implies that p ≻ q. This contradicts ≻|∆A = ∅. Hence,
≻0|∆A = ≻ˆ0|∆A .
Lemma 4 is the only part of the proof of Theorem 1 that requires anonymity. A much
weaker condition would also suffice: there has to be R ∈ DN , x, y ∈ U , i ∈ N , and
f(R) = ≻ such that x ≻i y and x ∼ y.
Next, we show that intensities of preferences between pure outcomes have to be identical.
Lemma 5. Let f be an anonymous Arrovian SWF on some rich domain D with |U| ≥ 4.
Then, for all ≻0 ∈ D and a, b, c ∈ U with a ≻0 b,
(i) b ≻0 c implies φ0(a, b) = φ0(b, c),
(ii) a ≻0 c implies φ0(a, b) = φ0(a, c),
(iii) c ≻0 b implies φ0(a, b) = φ0(c, b), and
(iv) c ≻0 a implies φ0(a, b) = φ0(c, a).
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Proof. Ad (i): Since, by Lemma 1, ≻0 satisfies Archimedean continuity, it follows that
b ∼0 aλc for some λ ∈ (0, 1). Observe that ≻
(ac)
0 |{a,b,c} = ≻
−1
0 |{a,b,c}, where (ac) denotes
the permutation that swaps a and c and leaves all other alternatives fixed. Lemma 4 implies
that ≻(ac)0 |∆{a,b,c} = ≻
−1
0 |∆{a,b,c} . Hence, we have b ∼0 cλa. Convexity of ≻0 then implies
that I(b) is convex and hence, b ∼0 1/2 a+ 1/2 c. This is equivalent to φ0(a, b) = φ0(b, c).
Ad (ii): we distinguish two cases.
Case 1 (b ∼0 c): Consider the preference profile
R = (≻0, (≻
(bc)
0 )
−1, ∅, . . . , ∅),
which exists by R1, R2, and R3.
Let ≻ = f(R). As in the proof of Lemma 4, we get that ≻|∆{a,b,c} = ∅. Without loss of
generality, assume that φ0(a, b) = 1 and φ0(a, c) = λ for some λ ∈ (0, 1]. Let p = 1/2 a+1/2 c
and q = 1/2 a+ 1/2 b and denote by φ1 and φ2 the SSB functions representing the preference
relations ≻0 and (≻
(bc)
0 )
−1, respectively. Then, φ1(p, q) = φ2(p, q) = 1/4 (1 − λ). If λ < 1,
the strict part of Pareto optimality of f implies that p ≻ q. This contradicts ≻|{a,b,c} = ∅.
Hence, λ = 1.
Case 2 (b ≻0 c): Assume without loss of generality that φ0(a, b) = 1. By (i), we get
φ0(a, b) = φ0(b, c) = 1. By R4, there is ≻ˆ0 ∈ D with a ≻ˆ0 b ≻ˆ0 c, a ≻ˆ0 c, and c ≻ˆ0 x for
some x ∈ U . Lemma 4 implies that φ0|{a,b,c} = φˆ0|{a,b,c}. Hence, it suffices to show that
φˆ0(a, c) = 1. By (i), we get that φˆ0(a, c) = φˆ0(c, x) and φˆ0(b, c) = φˆ0(c, x) = 1. Hence,
φˆ0(a, c) = 1.
Ad (iii): The proof is analogous to the proof of (ii).
Ad (iv): The proof is analogous to the proof of (i).
Theorem 1. Let f be an anonymous Arrovian SWF on some rich domain D with |U| ≥ 4.
Then, D ⊆ RPC .
Proof. Let ≻0 ∈ D and a, b, c, d ∈ U such that a ≻0 b and c ≻0 d. We have to show that
φ0(a, b) = φ0(c, d). First assume there are x ∈ {a, b} and y ∈ {c, d} such that x ≻0 y
or y ≻0 x. Then, Lemma 5 implies that φ0(a, b) = φ0(x, y) = φ0(c, d) or φ0(a, b) =
φ0(y, x) = φ0(c, d), respectively. Otherwise, x ∼0 y for all x ∈ {a, b} and y ∈ {c, d}. This
implies that ≻0|{a,b,c,d} = ≻0
(ac)(bd)|{a,b,c,d}. From Lemma 4 it follows that ≻0|∆{a,b,c,d} =
≻0
(ac)(bd)|∆{a,b,c,d}. Hence, φ0|{a,b,c,d} = φ
(ac)(bd)
0 |{a,b,c,d} and φ0(a, b) = φ0(c, d).
C. Characterization of the Social Welfare Function
Except for Theorem 2, all results in this section only require Pareto indifference rather
than Pareto optimality.
The following lemmas show that for all preference profiles R and all alternatives a and
b, φ(a, b) only depends on the set of agents who prefer a to b, whenever R is from the
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domain of PC preferences and φ represents f(R). We first prove that, if an alternative is
strictly Pareto dominated, then the intensities of collective preferences between each of the
dominating alternatives and the dominated alternative are identical.
Lemma 6. Let f be an SWF satisfying Pareto indifference and IIA on some rich domain
D ⊆ RPC with |U| ≥ 4. Let a, b, c ∈ U and R ∈ DN such that Nac = Nbc = N .
Then, φ(a, c) = φ(b, c) where φ ≡ f(R).
Proof. The idea of the proof is to introduce a fourth alternative, which serves as a cal-
ibration device for the intensity of pairwise comparisons, and eventually disregard this
alternative using IIA. To this end, let x ∈ U and consider a preference profile Rˆ ∈ DN such
that R|{a,b,c} = Rˆ|{a,b,c} and Nˆax = Nˆbx = Nˆcx = N which exists by R4. Let φˆ ≡ f(Rˆ).
The Pareto indifference relation with respect to Rˆ|{a,c,x} is identical to ∼1|{a,c,x}. The anal-
ogous statement holds for the Pareto indifference relation with respect to Rˆ|{b,c,x}. Hence,
Pareto indifference, Lemma 2, and IIA imply that there are α, β ∈ R such that
φˆ|{a,c,x} = α

 0 1 1−1 0 1
−1 −1 0

 and φˆ|{b,c,x} = β

 0 1 1−1 0 1
−1 −1 0

 .
As a consequence, α = β and φˆ(a, c) = φˆ(b, c). Since R|{a,b,c} = Rˆ|{a,b,c}, Lemma 4 and
IIA imply that φ|{a,b,c} ≡ φˆ|{a,b,c}. Hence, φ(a, c) = φ(b, c).
23
Lemma 7 shows that for a fixed preference profile, φ(a, b) only depends on Nab and Iab
(and not on the names of the alternatives).
Lemma 7. Let f be an SWF satisfying Pareto indifference and IIA on some rich domain
D ⊆ RPC with |U| ≥ 5, a, b, c, d ∈ U , and R ∈ DN such that Nab = Ncd and Nba = Ndc.
Then, φ(a, b) = φ(c, d) where φ ≡ f(R).
Proof. We first prove the case when all of a, b, c, d are distinct. Let e ∈ U and consider
a preference profile Rˆ ∈ DN such that R|{a,b,c,d} = Rˆ|{a,b,c,d} and Nˆae = Nˆbe = Nˆce =
Nˆde = N . Such a profile exists by R4. Then, by Lemma 6, we can assume without loss of
generality that φˆ(a, e) = φˆ(b, e) = φˆ(c, e) = φˆ(d, e) = λ ∈ R. Now consider a preference
profile R˚ ∈ DN such that
R˚|{a,b,c,d,e} = (


a
b
c
d
e

 , . . .
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Nab
,


d
c
b
a
e

 , . . .
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Nba
,
[
a, b, c, d
e
]
, . . . ),
23Pareto optimality also implies that φ(a, c), φ(b, c) > 0.
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which exists by R4. Note that Rˆ|{a,b,e} = R˚|{a,b,e} and Rˆ|{c,d,e} = R˚|{c,d,e} because Nab =
Ncd and Nba = Ndc by assumption. Now, let φˆ ≡ f(Rˆ) and φ˚ ≡ f(R˚). Since Rˆ|{a,b,e} =
R˚|{a,b,e}, we have φˆ|{a,b,e} ≡ φ˚|{a,b,e} by IIA. Moreover, Rˆ|{c,d,e} = R˚|{c,d,e} and IIA yield
φˆ|{c,d,e} ≡ φ˚|{c,d,e}. Lemma 6 implies that φ˚(a, e) = φ˚(b, e) = φ˚(c, e) = φ˚(d, e) = λ for some
λ ∈ R. Thus, for some µ, σ ∈ R, φ˚ takes the form
φ˚|{a,b,c,d,e} =


0 µ λ
−µ 0 λ
0 σ λ
−σ 0 λ
−λ −λ −λ −λ 0

 .
Note that R˚|{a,b,c,d} only consists of one fixed preference relation, its inverse, and complete
indifference. Hence, Pareto indifference and Lemma 2 imply that φ˚|{a,b,c,d} = αφ˚i|{a,b,c,d}
for some α ∈ R, i ∈ N , and φ˚i ≡ R˚i. As a consequence, we get that µ = σ. Since
φ|{a,b,c,d} = φˆ|{a,b,c,d}, it follows that φ(a, b) = φ(c, d).
The cases when a = c and b = c follow from repeated application of the above case. All
other cases are symmetric to one of the covered cases.
Lemma 8. Let f be an SWF satisfying Pareto indifference and IIA on some rich domain
D ⊆ RPC with |U| ≥ 5, a, b, c, d ∈ U , R, Rˆ ∈ DN , φ ≡ f(R), and φˆ ≡ f(Rˆ). If R|{a,b} =
Rˆ|{a,b} and R|{c,d} = Rˆ|{c,d}, then φ(a, b) = α · φˆ(a, b) and φ(c, d) = α · φˆ(c, d) for some
α > 0.
Proof. Let e ∈ U\{a, b, c, d} and R′, Rˆ′ ∈ DN such that R′|{a,b,c,d} = R|{a,b,c,d}, Rˆ
′|{a,b,c,d} =
Rˆ|{a,b,c,d}, and N ′ae = N
′
be = N
′
ce = N
′
de = Nˆ
′
ae = Nˆ
′
be = Nˆ
′
ce = Nˆ
′
de = N . The profiles
R′, Rˆ′ exist by R4. By φ′ ≡ f(R′) and φˆ′ ≡ f(Rˆ′) we denote the corresponding collective
SSB functions. Since f satisfies IIA, we have that φ|{a,b,c,d} ≡ φ
′|{a,b,c,d} and φˆ|{a,b,c,d} ≡
φˆ′|{a,b,c,d}. Lemma 6 implies that without loss of generality, φ′ and φˆ′ take the following
form for some λ, µ, µˆ, σ, σˆ ∈ R. Note that we can choose suitable representatives such that
φ′(a, e) = φˆ′(a, e) = λ.
φ′|{a,b,c,d,e} =


0 µ λ
−µ 0 λ
0 σ λ
−σ 0 λ
−λ −λ −λ −λ 0

 φˆ′|{a,b,c,d,e} =


0 µˆ λ
−µˆ 0 λ
0 σˆ λ
−σˆ 0 λ
−λ −λ −λ −λ 0


Observe that R′|{a,b,e} = Rˆ
′|{a,b,e} and R
′|{c,d,e} = Rˆ
′|{c,d,e} by construction. Since f
satisfies IIA, we get that φ′|{a,b,e} = φˆ′|{a,b,e} and φ′|{c,d,e} = φˆ′|{c,d,e}. In particular, this
means that µ = µˆ and σ = σˆ. Since φ|{a,b,c,d} ≡ φ
′|{a,b,c,d} and φˆ|{a,b,c,d} ≡ φˆ
′|{a,b,c,d}, there
is α > 0 as required.
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Lemma 8 shows that φ(a, b) only depends on Nab and Iab and not on a, b or R. Hence,
there is a function g : 2N × 2N → R such that g(Nab, Iab) = φ(a, b) for all a, b ∈ U and
R ∈ DN with φ ≡ f(R). We now leverage Pareto indifference to show that f is affine
utilitarian.
Lemma 9. Let f be an SWF satisfying Pareto indifference and IIA on some rich domain
D ⊆ RPC with |U| ≥ 5. Then, f is affine utilitarian.
Proof. Let R ∈ DN and (φi)i∈N ∈ ΦN such that (φi)i∈N ≡ R. For all G ⊆ N , let wG =
1/2 (g(N, ∅) + g(G, ∅)). For convenience, we write wi for w{i}. Since φ(x, y) = g(Nxy, Ixy)
for all x, y ∈ U , it suffices to show that
g(Nxy , Ixy) =
∑
i∈N
wiφi(x, y) =
∑
i∈Nxy
wi −
∑
i∈Nyx
wi, (1)
for all x, y ∈ U . To this end, we will first show that wG+wGˆ = wG∪Gˆ for all G, Gˆ ⊆ N with
G ∩ Gˆ = ∅. Let G, Gˆ as above, a, b, c, x, y ∈ U , and consider a preference profile R ∈ DN
such that
R|{a,b,c,x,y} = (


x
a
b
c
y

 , . . .
︸ ︷︷ ︸
G
,


b
y
c
x
a

 , . . .
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gˆ
,


c
x
a
y
b

 , . . . ),
which exists by R4. Let φ ≡ f(R). We have that, for p = 1/2 x + 1/2 y and q = 1/3 a +
1/3 b + 1/3 c, φi(p, q) = 0 for all i ∈ N . Pareto indifference implies that φ(p, q) = 0. Let
µ = g(G, ∅), µˆ = g(Gˆ, ∅), and σ = g(G ∪ Gˆ, ∅). By definition of w,
wG + wGˆ = wG∪Gˆ
is equivalent to
(g(N, ∅) + g(G, ∅)) + (g(N, ∅) + g(Gˆ, ∅)) = g(N, ∅) + g(G ∪ Gˆ, ∅).
Hence, we have to show that µ+ µˆ+ g(N, ∅) = σ. By definition of g, we get that φ takes
the following form.
φ|{a,b,c,x,y} =


0 −g(N, ∅) −µˆ
0 µˆ σ
0 −µ −µˆ
g(N, ∅) −µˆ µ 0
µˆ −σ µˆ 0


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From φ(p, q) = 0, it follows that 1/6 (µ + µˆ + g(N, ∅) − σ) = 0. This proves the desired
relationship.
Now we can rewrite (1) as g(Nxy , Ixy) = w(Nxy)−w(Nyx), which, by definition of w, is
equivalent to
2g(Nxy, Ixy) = g(Nxy, ∅) − g(Nyx, ∅). (2)
To prove (2), let a, b, x, y ∈ U and consider a preference profile Rˆ ∈ DN such that
Rˆ|{a,b,x,y} = (

 ax, y
b

 , . . .
︸ ︷︷ ︸
G
,

 xa
b, y

 , . . .
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gˆ
,

 bx, y
a

 , . . . ),
which exists by R2, R3, and R4. Let φˆ ≡ f(Rˆ). Observe that, for p = 1/3 x + 2/3 y and
q = 1/2 a+ 1/2 b, p∼ˆiq for all i ∈ N . Pareto indifference implies that φˆ(p, q) = 0. With the
same definitions as before and ε = g(G, Gˆ), φˆ takes the following form.
φˆ|{a,b,x,y} ≡


0 µ σ
0 −σ −ε
−µ σ 0
−σ ε 0


From φˆ(p, q) = 0, we get that 1/6 (−µ + σ − 2σ + 2ε) = 0. Hence, 2ε = µ + σ. This is
equivalent to
2g(G, Gˆ) = g(G, ∅) + g(G ∪ Gˆ, ∅) = g(G, ∅) − g(N \ (G ∪ Gˆ), ∅),
where the last equality follows from skew-symmetry of φˆ and the definition of g. This
proves (2).
Finally, the strict part of Pareto optimality implies that individual weights have to be
positive.
Theorem 2. Let f be an Arrovian SWF on some rich domain D ⊆ RPC with |U| ≥ 5.
Then, f is affine utilitarian with positive weights.
Proof. From Lemma 9 we know that there are w1, . . . , wn ∈ R such that, for all R ∈ DN
and φ1, . . . , φn ∈ ΦPC with (φi)i∈N ≡ R, f(R) ≡
∑
i∈N wiφi. Assume for contradiction
that wi ≤ 0 for some i ∈ N . Let G be the set of agents such that wi ≤ 0 and consider a
preference profile R ∈ DN with a, b ∈ U such that
R|{a,b} = (
[
a
b
]
, . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
G
,
[
a, b
]
, . . . ),
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which exists by R2 and R4. Let φ ≡ f(R). Then, we have that φi(a, b) = 1 for all i ∈ G
and φi(a, b) = 0 for all i ∈ N \G. Pareto optimality of f implies that φ(a, b) > 0. However,
we have
φ(a, b) = α

∑
i∈G
wi φi(a, b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+
∑
i∈N\G
wi φi(a, b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0

 = α∑
i∈G
wi ≤ 0
for some α > 0. This is a contradiction.
D. Characterizations for vNM preferences
In this section, we consider Arrovian SWFs with domain and range RvNM instead of R.
For this case, we characterize both the largest domain of individual preferences that allows
for anonymous Arrovian aggregation and the class of Arrovian SWFs on this domain, and
thereby provide analogous statements to Theorems 1 and 2 when restricting R to RvNM .
A subdomain of vNM preferences is the domain of dichotomous preferences Rdich =
RvNM ∩ RPC , where every agent can assign one of only two different vNM utility values,
say 0 and 1, to every pure outcome. Theorem 3 shows that this domain is the largest
domain satisfying R1, R2, and R3 on which anonymous Arrovian SWFs exist.
Theorem 3. Let f be an anonymous Arrovian SWF with range RvNM on some domain
D ⊆ RvNM satisfying R1, R2, and R3. Then, D ⊆ Rdich .
Proof. If |U| ≤ 2, then RvNM = Rdich , which immediately implies the statement of the
theorem. So consider the case that |U| ≥ 3 and assume for contradiction that D 6⊆ Rdich ,
i.e., there is ≻0 ∈ D such that a ≻0 b ≻0 c for some a, b, c ∈ U . Observe that Lemma 3
holds for D, since D satisfies R1, R2, and R3 and contains a preference relation with three
indifference classes on pure outcomes, e.g., ≻0. Hence, for all G,H ⊆ N and x, y ∈ U , if
(G,H) is decisive for x against y, then (G,H) is decisive for all pairs of alternatives, i.e.,
x DG,H y implies DG,H = U × U .
Now let x, y ∈ U and ≻x0 ,≻
y
0 ∈ D such that x ≻
x
0 y and y ≻
y
0 x, which exist by ≻0 ∈ D
and R1, and consider the preference profiles
R = (≻x0 ,≻
y
0, ∅, . . . , ∅) and R¯ = (≻
y
0,≻
x
0 , ∅, . . . , ∅),
which exist by R2. Let ≻ = f(R), ≻¯ = f(R¯) and observe that, by anonymity of f , ≻ = ≻¯.
If x ≻ y or y ≻ x, then Lemma 3 implies that y ≻¯ x or x ≻¯ y, respectively, which
contradicts ≻ = ≻¯. Hence, x ∼ y.
Lastly, let ≻1,≻2 ∈ D such that a ≻1 b ≻1 c and c ≻2 a ≻2 b, which exist by ≻0 ∈ D
and R1, and consider the preference profile
Rˆ = (≻1,≻2, ∅, . . . , ∅),
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which exists by R2. Let ≻ˆ = f(Rˆ). Since f satisfies IIA, it follows from what we have shown
above that a ∼ˆ c and b ∼ˆ c. Together with the fact that ≻ˆ ∈ RvNM , this implies a ∼ˆ b.
However, since f satisfies Pareto optimality, we have a ≻ˆ b, which is a contradiction.
Secondly, we characterize the class of Arrovian SWFs on domains of dichotomous prefer-
ences. To this end, we need to make a richness assumption for domains D ⊆ Rdich , which
prescribes that all dichotomous preferences relations on any set of up to four alternatives
are possible.
For all ≻ˆ ∈ Rdich and X ⊆ U , |X| ≤ 4, there is ≻ ∈ D such that ≻|X = ≻ˆ|X . (R5)
We show that every Arrovian SWF on subdomains of Rdich satisfying R5 is affine util-
itarian with positive weights. Similar to Lemma 9, we first prove that affine utilitarian
SWFs are the only SWFs satisfying Pareto indifference and IIA.
Lemma 10. Let f be an SWF satisfying Pareto indifference and IIA with range RvNM on
some domain D ⊆ Rdich satisfying R5 with |U| ≥ 4. Then, f is affine utilitarian.
Proof. The proof is structured as follows. We start by defining a function w that assigns
a weight to every set of agents based on the output of f for specific profiles. It will turn
out that f is affine utilitarian for the weights that w assigns to singleton sets. To prove
this, we show that w is additive, i.e., the weight of the union of two disjoint sets of agents
is equal to the sum of the weights of both sets.
First observe that, for all R ∈ DN , f(R) ≡ φ, and x, y, z ∈ U , we have
φ(x, z) = φ(x, y) + φ(y, z), (3)
since φ ∈ RvNM by assumption. If f(R) ≡ 0 for all R ∈ DN , we can choose wi = 0 for
all i ∈ N . Otherwise, there is Rˆ ∈ DN such that f(Rˆ) ≡ φˆ 6= 0. Let a, b, c, d ∈ U be
four distinct alternatives. We may assume without loss of generality that φˆ(a, b) 6= 0. Let
R¯ ∈ DN , f(R¯) ≡ φ¯, such that the preferences between a and b are as in Rˆ and both a and b
are weakly preferred to c by all agents. Formally, R¯|{a,b} = Rˆ|{a,b}, N¯ac = Nˆab, N¯bc = Nˆba,
and N¯ca = N¯cb = ∅, i.e.,
R¯|{a,b,c} = (
[
a
b, c
]
, . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
Nˆab
,
[
b
a, c
]
, . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
Nˆba
,
[
a, b, c
]
, . . . ).
The profile R¯ exists by R5. Since f satisfies IIA, it follows that φ¯(a, b) 6= 0. By (3), we have
that φ¯(a, b) = φ¯(a, c) + φ¯(c, b) 6= 0. Hence, by skew-symmetry of φ¯, either φ¯(a, c) 6= 0 or
φ¯(b, c) 6= 0. Without loss of generality, we may assume that φ¯(a, c) 6= 0. Let G∗ = N¯ac 6= ∅
and note that I¯ac = N \G∗, since N¯ca = ∅. The set of agents G∗ will remain fixed for the
rest of this proof. Since φ¯(a, c) 6= 0 and f satisfies IIA, G∗ can be used to calibrate the
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utility values across different profiles. Based on G∗, we will now construct a function w
that assigns a weight to every set of agents. For every G ⊆ N , let RG ∈ DN , f(RG) ≡ φG
such that RG|{a,c} = R¯|{a,c}, N
G
bc = G, and I
G
bc = N \G. Hence,
RG|{a,b,c} = (︸ ︷︷ ︸
G∗
[
a
b, c
]
, . . . ,
G︷ ︸︸ ︷[
a, b
c
]
, . . . ,
[
b
a, c
]
, . . . ,
[
a, b, c
]
, . . . ).
The profiles RG exist by R5. Let
wG =
φG(b, c)
φG(a, c)
. (4)
Since RG|{a,c} = R¯|{a,c} and f satisfies IIA, we have that φG(a, c) 6= 0 and hence, wG is
well-defined. Intuitively, wG is the weight of the agents in G relative to the weight of the
agents in G∗.
We will first show that wG is independent of the choice of a, b, c and RG. To this end,
let R ∈ DN , f(R) ≡ φ, and x, y, z ∈ U (not necessarily distinct from a, b, c) such that
R(xa)(yb)(zc)|{a,b,c} = R
G|{a,b,c}, where (xa)(yb)(zc) is the permutation that swaps x with a,
y with b, and z with c. We first consider the case that x = a, y = b, and z ∈ U\{a, b, c}. Let
R′ ∈ DN , f(R′) ≡ φ′, such that R′|{a,b,c} = R
G|{a,b,c} and R
′|{a,b,z} = R|{a,b,z}, which exists
by R5. Since f satisfies IIA, we have that φ′|{a,b,c} ≡ φG|{a,b,c} and φ′|{a,b,z} ≡ φ|{a,b,z}.
Note that, by the choice of R and RG, we have that I ′cz = N . Since f satisfies Pareto
indifference, it follows that φ′(c, z) = 0. Using the definition of φ′ for the first and the third
equality and (3) for the second equality, we get
φ(b, z)
φ(a, z)
=
φ′(b, z)
φ′(a, z)
=
φ′(b, c)
φ′(a, c)
=
φG(b, c)
φG(a, c)
= wG.
Repeated application of this case yields the desired statement for arbitrary x, y, z.
Next we show that w is additive, i.e., for all G, Gˆ ⊆ N with G ∩ Gˆ = ∅,
wG + wGˆ = wG∪Gˆ. (5)
To this end, let R ∈ DN , f(R) ≡ φ, such that Nbd = G, Ncd = Gˆ, Nad = G∗, and
Nda = Ndb = Ndc = ∅, i.e., d is least preferred among {a, b, c, d} by all agents. The
profile R exists by R5. By (4), we have that φ(b, d) = wGφ(a, d) and φ(c, d) = wGˆφ(a, d).
Moreover, let R¯ ∈ DN , f(R¯) ≡ φ¯, such that N¯bd = G, N¯ad = G ∪ Gˆ, N¯cd = G∗, and
N¯da = N¯db = N¯dc = ∅, which exists by R5. By (4), we have that φ¯(b, d) = wGφ¯(c, d)
and φ¯(a, d) = w
G∪Gˆφ¯(c, d). Let R˜ ∈ D
N , f(R˜) ≡ φ˜, such that R˜|{b,c,d} = R|{b,c,d} and
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R˜|{a,b,d} = R¯|{a,b,d}, which completely determines R˜|{a,b,c,d}, since D ⊆ R
dich . The profile
R˜ exists by R5 and is depicted below.
R˜|{a,b,c,d} = (
[
a, b
c, d
]
, . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
G
,
[
a, c
b, d
]
, . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gˆ
,
[
a, b, c, d
]
, . . . )
Since f satisfies IIA, we have that φ˜|{b,c,d} ≡ φ|{b,c,d}. Hence, there is α > 0 such that
φ˜(b, d) = αwG and φ˜(c, d) = αwGˆ. Again, since f satisfies IIA, we have that φ˜|{a,b,d} ≡
φ¯|{a,b,d}. Hence, there is β > 0 such that φ˜(b, d) = βwG and φ˜(a, d) = βwG∪Gˆ. Since
D ⊆ Rdich ⊆ RvNM , f(R˜) ∈ RvNM , and f satisfies Pareto indifference, Harsanyi’s Social
Aggregation Theorem (1955) implies that there are vi ∈ R for all i ∈ N such that φ˜ ≡∑
i∈N viφ˜i where (φ˜i)i∈N ≡ R˜. Thus,
φ˜(a, d) =
∑
i∈G∪Gˆ
vi =
∑
i∈G
vi +
∑
i∈Gˆ
vi = φ˜(b, d) + φ˜(c, d).
If φ˜(b, d) = φ˜(c, d) = 0, then φ˜(a, d) = 0 and wG = wGˆ = wG∪Gˆ = 0. In particular,
w
G∪Gˆ = wG + wGˆ and we are done. Otherwise, we may assume without loss of generality
that φ˜(b, d) 6= 0. This implies that α = β. Hence, we have that
αw
G∪Gˆ = φ˜(a, d) = φ˜(b, d) + φ˜(c, d) = α(wG + wGˆ),
which proves the desired statement.
Hence, to prove that f is affine utilitarian with weights wi = w{i} for all i ∈ N , it suffices
to show that, for all R ∈ DN , f(R) ≡ φ, there is α > 0 such that φ(x, y) = α(wNxy −wNyx)
for all x, y ∈ U . To this end, we first show that φ(x, y) = 0 if and only if wNxy −wNyx = 0.
Without loss of generality, assume that {x, y} ∩ {a, b} = ∅ and let R¯ ∈ DN such that
N¯xb = Nxy, N¯yb = Nyx, N¯ab = G∗, and N¯ba = N¯bx = N¯by = ∅, which exists by R5. Note
that this implies R¯{x,y} = R{x,y} since D ⊆ Rdich . Applying (4) and (3) for the first and
second equality, respectively, we have that
wNxy −wNyx =
φ¯(x, b)
φ¯(a, b)
−
φ¯(y, b)
φ¯(a, b)
=
φ¯(x, y)
φ¯(a, b)
.
Since f satisfies IIA, φ(x, y) is a positive multiple of φ¯(x, y) from which the desired rela-
tionship follows.
Now if φ = 0, it follows that, for all x, y ∈ U , φ(x, y) = wNxy−wNyx = 0 and we can choose
α > 0 arbitrarily. Otherwise, we may assume without loss of generality that φ(a, b) 6= 0,
which implies that wNab − wNba 6= 0. Let α ∈ R such that φ(a, b) = α(wNab − wNba). We
aim to show that, for all x, y ∈ U , φ(x, y) = α(wNxy − wNyx). To this end, let x, y ∈ U . If
{x, y} = {a, b}, this is clear by skew-symmetry of φ. Otherwise we may assume without
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loss of generality that x ∈ U \ {a, b} and, by (3), that φ(a, x) 6= 0. Let Rˆ ∈ DN , f(Rˆ) ≡ φˆ,
such that R|{a,b,x} = Rˆ|{a,b,x} and, Nˆya = Nˆyb = Nˆyc = ∅, which exists by R5. Note that
Nˆya = ∅ implies that Nˆby ∩ Nˆba = Nˆba, since D ⊆ Rdich ⊆ RvNM only contains transitive
preference relations; likewise, Nˆay ∩ Nˆab = Nˆab. From before, we have that there is γ > 0
such that φˆ(a, y) = γw
Nˆay
, φˆ(b, y) = γw
Nˆby
, and φˆ(x, y) = γw
Nˆxy
. Hence, we have that
φˆ(a, b) = φˆ(a, y) − φˆ(b, y) = γ(w
Nˆay
− w
Nˆby
)
= γ((w
Nˆay ∩ Nˆab︸ ︷︷ ︸
Nˆab
+ w
Nˆay∩Iˆab
)− (w
Nˆby ∩ Nˆba︸ ︷︷ ︸
Nˆba
+ w
Nˆby ∩ Iˆab︸ ︷︷ ︸
Nˆay∩Iˆab
)) = γ(w
Nˆab
−w
Nˆba
),
where the first equality follows from (3) and skew-symmetry of φˆ and the third equality
follows from (5). Similarly, we get that φˆ(a, x) = γ(w
Nˆax
− w
Nˆxa
).
Since f satisfies IIA, it follows that φ|{a,b,x} ≡ φˆ|{a,b,x}. Hence, φ(a, x) = α(wNax−wNxa),
and, by a similar argument, φ(a, y) = α(wNay−wNya). Observe that by (5) and D ⊆ R
dich ,
wNxy = wNxa∩Nxy + wNay∩Nxy = wNxa − wNya∩Nxa + wNay − wNax∩Nay
and
wNyx = wNya∩Nyx + wNax∩Nyx = wNya − wNxa∩Nya + wNax − wNay∩Nax .
Note that the minus terms are the same in both of the above equalities. Then, we have
that
φ(x, y) = φ(x, a) − φ(y, a) = α(wNxa − wNax − wNya + wNay) = α(wNxy − wNyx),
where the first equality follows from (3) and skew-symmetry of φ, the second equality
follows from skew-symmetry of φ, and the third equality follows from the statements about
wNxy and wNyx derived above. This proves the desired equation.
When assuming that f satisfies full Pareto optimality instead of Pareto indifference, the
weights of all agents have to be positive and we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Let f be an Arrovian SWF with range RvNM on some domain D ⊆ Rdich
satisfying R5 with |U| ≥ 4. Then, f is affine utilitarian with positive weights.
Theorem 4 follows from Lemma 10 in the same way as Theorem 2 follows from Lemma 9.
Its proof is therefore omitted. If we additionally assume that f is anonymous, the weights
of all agents have to be equal, and outcomes are ordered by the vNM utility function that
assigns to each alternative the number of agents who approve it.
Corollary 2. Let |U| ≥ 4 and D ⊆ RvNM be some domain satisfying R5. An anonymous
SWF with range RvNM is Arrovian if and only if it is the utilitarian SWF and D ⊆ Rdich .
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Remark 6 (Tightness of Bound). Theorem 4 does not hold if |U | < 4. Let U = {a, b, c}
and consider the SWF f defined as follows. For all R ∈ DN and x, y, z ∈ U , f(R) ≡ φ
with φ(x, y) = φ(y, z) = 1 and φ(x, z) = 2 if |Nxy| > |Nyx| and |Nyz | > |Nzy|, and
otherwise f(R) ≡
∑
i∈N φi where (φi)i∈N ∈ Φ
N such that (φi)i∈N ≡ R. In the former
case, |Nxz| > |Nzx|, since the agents’ preferences are dichotomous. It can be checked that
f satisfies Pareto optimality and IIA. Note that, in line with Maniquet and Mongin’s 2015
theorem, the collective preferences over pure outcomes returned by f coincide with the
utilitarian SWF (see also Footnote 14).
Remark 7 (SWFs with range R). Theorems 3 and 4 do not hold for SWFs with range
R. To see this for Theorem 3, let N = {1, 2}, U = {a, b, c}, and ≻0 ∈ RvNM such that
≻0 ≡

 0 1 2−1 0 1
−2 −1 0

 .
Consider the domain D = {≻0pi : pi ∈ ΠU}∪{∅}, which satisfies R1, R2, and R3. Then, the
following SWF f is an anonymous Arrovian SWF on D. For all R ∈ DN and x, y, z ∈ U ,
f(R) ≡ φ with φ(x, y) = 1 and φ(x, z) = φ(y, z) = 0
if x ≻1 y ≻1 z and z ≻2 x ≻2 y and f(R) ≡ φ1+φ2 otherwise. IIA is easy to verify, since
this SWF is consistent with majority rule on pairs of pure outcomes. Pareto optimality is
clearly satisfied for all profiles where f coincides with the utilitarian rule. In the remaining
profiles, Pareto optimality can be verified by simple but tedious calculations.
A counterexample using two agents and four alternatives can be constructed to show
that Theorem 4 does not hold for SWFs with range R.
E. Rationalizability via Continuous and Convex Relations
Recall from Section 4 that a choice function is an upper hemi-continuous function
S : F(∆) → F(∆) such that for all X ∈ F(∆), S(X) ⊆ X, and for all p, q ∈ ∆,
S([p, q]) ∈ {{p}, {q}, [p, q]}. To formally define upper hemi-continuity, we need to intro-
duce a notion of convergence for sequences in F(∆). To this end, for all X,Y ∈ F(∆), let
dist(X,Y ) = max{supx∈X infy∈Y |x− y|, supy∈Y infx∈X |x− y|} be the Hausdorff distance
of X and Y . With this definition, dist is a metric on F(∆) and we say that a sequence
(Xi)i∈N ⊆ F(∆) converges to X ∈ F(∆), written Xi → X, if dist(Xi,X) goes to 0 as
i goes to infinity. A choice function S is upper hemi-continuous if, for all (Xi)i∈N with
Xi → X ∈ F(∆) and (pi)i∈N with pi ∈ S(Xi) for all i ∈ N and pi → p ∈ ∆, p ∈ S(X).
Proposition 2. A choice function is rationalizable via a continuous and convex relation
if and only if it is consistent.
Proof. Let S be a choice function. First we prove the “only if” part. To this end, assume
that S is rationalizable by a continuous and convex relation ≻, i.e., for all X ∈ F(∆),
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S(X) = max≻X. For X,Y ∈ F(∆) with X ∩ Y 6= ∅, S(X) ∩ Y = (max≻X) ∩ Y ⊆
max≻(X ∩ Y ) = S(X ∩ Y ), since a maximal element in X is also a maximal element in
any subset of X (without imposing any restrictions on ≻). Hence, S satisfies contraction.
To see that S satisfies expansion, let X,Y ∈ F(∆) and observe that S(X) ∩ S(Y ) =
max≻X ∩ max≻ Y ⊆ max≻(conv(X ∪ Y )) = S(X ∪ Y ), where the set inclusion follows
from the fact that, by convexity of ≻, weak lower contour sets are convex.
Second we prove the “if part”, i.e., S is rationalizable by a continuous and convex relation
if it satisfies contraction and expansion. To this end, define ≻ as the base relation of S,
i.e., for all p, q ∈ ∆, p % q if and only if p ∈ S([p, q]). Note that % is a complete relation,
since, for all p, q ∈ ∆, {p, q} ∩ S([p, q]) 6= ∅ by our definition of choice functions.
First we show that ≻ rationalizes S, i.e., for all X ∈ F(∆), S(X) = max≻X. To see
that S(X) ⊆ max≻X, let p ∈ S(X). Since S satisfies contraction, it follows that, for all
q ∈ X, p ∈ S([p, q]) and hence, by definition of ≻, p % q. This implies that p ∈ max≻X.
To prove that max≻X ⊆ S(X), let p ∈ max≻X and (Xk)k∈N be a sequence of polytopes in
∆ such that, for all k ∈ N, p ∈ Xk, Xk = conv(pk,1, . . . , pk,lk) ⊆ X, lk ∈ N, and Xk → X.
Since p ∈ max≻X, we have that, for all k ∈ N and l ∈ {1, . . . , lk}, p % pk,l and thus,
by definition of ≻, p ∈ S([p, pk,l]). Repeated application of expansion implies that, for all
k ∈ N, p ∈ conv(pk,1, . . . , pk,lk) = Xk. Then, since Xk → X, continuity of S implies that
p ∈ S(X).
It remains to be shown that ≻ satisfies continuity and convexity. To prove continuity, let
p ∈ ∆. First, assume for contradiction that L(p) is not open at q ∈ L(p). Then, there is a
sequence (qk)k∈N ⊆ ∆ such that qk goes to q as k goes to infinity and qk % p for all k ∈ N.
Since then [p, qk]→ [p, q] and qk ∈ S([p, qk]) for all k ∈ N by definition of ≻, continuity of
S implies that q ∈ S([p, q]), which contradicts p ≻ q. Second, assume for contradiction that
U(p) is not open at q ∈ U(p). Then, there is a sequence (qk)k∈N ⊆ ∆ such that qk goes to
q as k goes to infinity and p % qk for all k ∈ N. Since then [p, qk]→ [p, q] and p ∈ S([p, qk])
for all k ∈ N by definition of ≻, continuity of S implies that p ∈ S([p, q]), which contradicts
q ≻ p. Hence, ≻ is continuous and, by Lemma 1, also satisfies Archimedean continuity.
Proving convexity of ≻ turns out be rather involved. We first prove three useful auxiliary
statements. We say that a preference relation ≻ is all indifferent on X ∈ F(∆) if ≻|X = ∅,
i.e., for all p, q ∈ X, p ∼ q.
Claim 1. For all p, q, r ∈ ∆, if p ∼ q, p ∼ r, and q ∼ r, then ≻ is all indifferent on
conv(p, q, r).
Proof of Claim 1. To see this, observe that, by definition of ≻, p ∼ q and p ∼ r im-
plies that p ∈ S([p, q]) and p ∈ S([p, r]). Since S satisfies expansion, we have that
p ∈ S(conv([p, q] ∪ [p, r])) = S(conv(p, q, r)). Similarly, q, r ∈ S(conv(p, q, r)). Since
S(conv(p, q, r)) ∈ F(∆) is convex, it follows that S(conv(p, q, r)) = conv(p, q, r). Hence,
since S satisfies contraction, for all s, t ∈ conv(p, q, r), [s, t] = S(conv(p, q, r)) ∩ [s, t] ⊆
S([s, t]). By definition of ≻, we have that s ∼ t, which proves that ≻ is all indifferent on
conv(p, q, r).
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We say that ≻ satisfies lower betweenness if for all p, q ∈ ∆ with p % q, there is λ∗ ∈ [0, 1]
such that, for all µ, µ′ ∈ [0, 1] with µ > µ′,{
pµq ≻ pµ′q if µ > λ∗,
pµq ∼ pµ′q if µ ≤ λ∗.
(lower betweenness)
If the above holds, we say that ≻ satisfies λ∗-lower betweenness on [p, q]. Intuitively,
λ∗-lower betweenness on [p, q] prescribes that, when moving along the line from p to q,
preference strictly decreases until pλ∗q is reached and then remains constant.
Claim 2. ≻ satisfies lower betweenness.
Proof of Claim 2. Let p, q ∈ ∆ with p % q. We distinguish two cases. If S([p, q]) = [p, q],
then p ∼ q by definition of ≻. From Claim 1 (with r = p), it follows that ≻ is all indifferent
on [p, q] and we may choose λ∗ = 1.
If S([p, q]) 6= [p, q], we have that p 6∼ q by definition of ≻. Since p % q by assumption,
it follows that p ≻ q. Let λ∗ = supλ∈[0,1]{q ∈ S([pλq, q])}. Note that, since p ≻ q and
S satisfies continuity, λ∗ < 1. By continuity of S and definition of λ∗, q ∈ S([pλ∗q, q])
and, since pλ′q ∈ S([pλ′q, q]) for all λ′ > λ∗, pλ∗q ∈ S([pλ∗q, q]). Together this yields that
S([pλ∗q, q]) = [pλ∗q, q] and hence, by Claim 1, ≻ is all indifferent on [pλ∗q, q]. Now we show
that, for all λ ∈ [0, 1], pλq % q. If λ > λ∗, this follows from the definition of λ∗. If λ ≤ λ∗, it
follows from the fact that ≻ is all indifferent on [pλ∗q, q] that pλq ∼ q. Now let µ, µ′ ∈ [0, 1]
such that µ > µ′. If µ > λ∗, assume for contradiction that pµ′q % pµq. By definition of ≻,
this implies that pµ′q ∈ S([pµq, pµ′q]). From pµ′q % q, it follows that pµ′q ∈ S([pµ′q, q]).
Then, expansion implies that pµ′q ∈ S(conv([pµq, pµ′q] ∪ [pµ′q, q])) = S([pµq, q]). By our
definition of choice functions, pµ′q ∈ S([pµq, q]) implies S([pµq, q]) = [pµq, q]. Hence, in
particular, q ∈ S([pµq, q]), which contradicts the assumption that µ > λ∗. If µ ≤ λ∗,
pµq ∼ pµ′q follows from the fact that ≻ is all indifferent on [pλ∗q, q].
Claim 3. For all p ∈ ∆, I(p) is convex.
Proof of Claim 3. Let p, q, r ∈ ∆ and λ ∈ [0, 1] such that p ∼ q and p ∼ r. We show that
p ∼ qλr. The proof proceeds as follows. It is easy derived that p is weakly preferred to
qλr. So we assume for contradiction that p is strictly preferred to qλr. By Claim 2, there
is some λ∗ between 0 and 1 such that preference strictly decreases when moving along a
straight line from p to pλ∗(qλr). In particular, ≻ is not all indifferent on any non-trivial
subinterval of this line segment. In the remainder of the proof, we construct a subset of
conv(p, q, r) (which will turn out to be conv(pµ¯r∗, pµˆr∗, t)) on which ≻ is all indifferent
that contains a non-trivial subinterval of the line segment from p to pλ∗(qλr), which is a
contradiction. The proof of this claim is illustrated in Figure 5a. The proofs of (ii) and (iii)
below follow a similar structure.
If q ∼ r, it follows from Claim 1 that ≻ is all indifferent on conv(p, q, r), which implies
that p ∼ qλr. Otherwise, we may assume without loss of generality that q ≻ r. Since p ∼ q,
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p ∼ r, and S satisfies expansion, it follows that p ∈ S(conv(p, q, r)). Hence, since S satisfies
contraction, for all λ ∈ [0, 1], p ∈ S(conv(p, qλr)), i.e., p % qλr. Assume for contradiction
that p ≻ qλr for some λ ∈ [0, 1]. Let λ+ = supλ∈[0,1]{p ≻ qλr}, λ
− = infλ∈[0,1]{p ≻ qλr},
q∗ = qλ+r, and r∗ = qλ−r. Since, by continuity of ≻, L(p)∩ [q, r] is open in [q, r], it follows
that λ+ > λ > λ− and p ∼ q∗ and p ∼ r∗. Moreover, since q ≻ r it follows from Claim 2
that q∗ ∼ r∗ or q∗ ≻ r∗. If q∗ ∼ r∗, ≻ is all indifferent on conv(p, q∗, r∗) by Claim 1, which
contradicts p ≻ qλr.
In the rest of the proof of this claim, we will consider the case q∗ ≻ r∗. First we show
that, for all µ ∈ [0, 1), q∗ ≻ pµr∗. Since p ∼ q∗ and q∗ ≻ r∗, the fact that S satisfies
expansion implies that q∗ ∈ S(conv(p, q∗, r∗)). Thus, the fact that S satisfies contraction
implies that q∗ ∈ S([q∗, s]) for all s ∈ conv(p, q∗, r∗). If q∗ ∼ pµr∗ for some µ ∈ [0, 1),
then we have that p ∼ q∗, p ∼ pµr∗, and q∗ ∼ pµr∗, which, by Claim 1, implies ≻ is
all indifferent on conv(p, q∗, pµr∗). By Claim 2, there is λ∗ ∈ [0, 1) such that ≻ satisfies
λ∗-lower betweenness on [p, qλr]. Hence, for µ, µ′ close to 1, pµ(qλr) ≻ pµ′(qλr) and
pµ(qλr), pµ′(qλr) ∈ conv(p, q∗, pµr∗), which is a contradiction to the fact that ≻ is all
indifferent on conv(p, q∗, pµr∗). Hence, for all µ ∈ [0, 1), q∗ ≻ pµr∗. From this it follows
by Claim 2 that, for all s ∈ conv(p, q∗, r∗) \ [p, q∗], q∗ ≻ s.
We now show that there are λ¯, λˆ ∈ [0, 1] and µ¯, µˆ ∈ [0, 1] such that λ¯ > λˆ > λ and
µ¯ > µˆ, q∗λ¯r∗ ∼ pµ¯r∗ and q∗λˆr∗ ∼ pµˆr∗, and pλ∗(qλr) is in the relative interior of
conv(pµ¯r, q∗λ¯r∗, r∗). By definition of q∗, there is a sequence (λk)k∈N such that λk goes
to 1 and, for all k ∈ N, p ≻ q∗λkr∗. Observe that, for all k ∈ N, p ≻ q∗λkr∗ % r∗.
Using the fact that ≻ satisfies Archimedean continuity by Lemma 1 it follows that, for
all k ∈ N, there is µk ∈ [0, 1) such that q∗λkr∗ ∼ pµkr∗. By definition of ≻, for all
k ∈ N, pµkr∗ ∈ S([q∗λkr∗, pµkr∗]). Since q∗λkr∗ → q∗, it follows from continuity of S that
pµ∗r∗ ∈ S([pµ∗r∗, q∗]), where µ∗ is an accumulation point of (µk)k∈N. Since q∗ ≻ s for all
s ∈ conv(p, q∗, r∗) \ [p, q∗], it follows that µ∗ = 1, i.e., µk goes to 1 as λk goes to 1. Now
let k¯, kˆ ∈ N such that λ¯ = λk¯ > λˆ = λkˆ > λ, µ¯ = µk¯ > µˆ = µkˆ and pλ
∗(qλr) is in the
relative interior of conv(pµ¯r, q∗λ¯r∗, r∗). Such k¯, kˆ exist, since λk and µk go to 1 as k goes
to infinity.
Lastly, we show that ≻ is all indifferent on a line segment that properly intersect that
line segment from p to pλ∗(qλr), which will yield a contradiction. Let t ∈ [pµ¯r∗, q∗λ¯r∗] ∩
[p, q∗λˆr∗], which exists, since λ¯ > λˆ. Since pµˆr∗ ∼ p, pµˆr∗ ∼ q∗λˆr∗, and S satisfies
expansion, we have that pµˆr∗ ∈ S(conv(p, pµˆr∗, q∗λˆr∗)). As S satisfies contraction, it
follows that pµˆr∗ % t.
Conversely, from p ∼ q∗, p ∼ r∗, and q∗ ≻ r∗, it follows that p, q∗ ∈ S(conv(p, q∗, r∗)) and
hence, [p, q∗] ⊆ S(conv(p, q∗, r∗)). Let σ ∈ (0, 1) such that t ∈ [pσq∗, pµˆr∗]. Since pσq∗ ∈
[p, q∗], it follows from the fact that S satisfies contraction that pσq∗ ∈ S([pσq∗, pµˆr∗]) and
so pσq∗ % pµˆr∗ by definition of ≻. Assuming that pµˆr∗ ≻ t would, by Claim 2, imply that
pµˆr∗ ≻ pσq∗ and thus a contradiction. So t % pµˆr∗.
In summary, we have pµˆr∗ ∼ t. Additionally, it holds that pµ¯r∗ ∼ pµˆr∗ (since p ∼ r∗)
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and pµ¯r∗ ∼ t (since pµ¯r∗ ∼ q∗λ¯r∗). Thus, ≻ is all indifferent on conv(pµ¯r, pµˆr∗, t) by
Claim 1. By construction of λ¯, the line segment from p to pλ∗(qλr) intersects the relative
interior of conv(pµ¯r, pµˆr∗, t). Thus, there are λ′, λ′′ ∈ (0, 1) such that λ′′ > λ′ ≥ λ∗
and pλ′(qλr), pλ′′(qλr) ∈ conv(pµ¯r∗, pµˆr∗, t), i.e., pλ′(qλr), pλ′′(qλr) are contained in the
intersection of the line segment from p to pλ∗(qλr) and conv(pµ¯r, pµˆr∗, t). Since ≻ satisfies
λ∗-lower betweenness on [p, qλr], it holds that pλ′(qλr) ≻ pλ′′(qλr), which contradicts the
fact that ≻ is all indifferent on conv(pµ¯r∗, pµˆr∗, t). Hence, for all λ ∈ [0, 1], p ∼ qλr, which
proves the claim.
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Figure 5: Illustration of the proof of Proposition 2. A solid line with or without an arrow-
head from one outcome u to another outcome v denotes that u ≻ v or u ∼ v,
respectively. A dashed line with an arrowhead from u to v denotes that u % v.
The dotted line indicates an indeterminate preference.
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Now we are in a position to show that ≻ satisfies convexity. This requires to show that,
for all p ∈ ∆, L(p), U(p), L(p) ∪ I(p), and U(p) ∪ I(p) are convex.
(i) L(p) ∪ I(p) is convex: Let q, r ∈ L(p) ∪ I(p) and λ ∈ [0, 1]. By definition of ≻,
p ∈ S([p, q])∩S([p, r]). Since S satisfies expansion, it follows that p ∈ S(conv(p, q, r)).
Then, S satisfying contraction implies that p ∈ S([p, qλr]), i.e., p % qλr.
(ii) L(p) is convex: Let q, r ∈ L(p) and λ ∈ [0, 1]. The proof for this case is illustrated in
Figure 5b. By (i), we know that p % qλr. Assume for contradiction that p ∼ qλr. Let
µ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for all µ ∈ (µ∗, 1), pµr ≻ q, which exists since, by continuity
of ≻, U(q) is open. Similarly, there is σ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for all σ ∈ (σ∗, 1),
pσq ≻ r. For all σ ∈ (σ∗, 1), let µσ ∈ (0, 1) such that pσq ∼ pµσr, which exists since,
by lower betweenness, p ≻ pσq, pσq ≻ r, and ≻ satisfies Archimedean continuity by
Lemma 1. Hence, for all σ ∈ (σ∗, 1), pµσr ∈ S([pσq, pµσr]). Since pσq goes to p as
σ goes to 1 and, by lower betweenness, p ≻ pµr for all µ ∈ (0, 1), continuity of S
implies that µσ goes to 1 as σ goes to 1. Thus, there is σ ∈ (σ∗, 1) such that µσ > µ∗.
By construction of σ, [pσq, pµσr] ∩ [p, qλr] 6= ∅. Let s ∈ [pσq, pµσr] ∩ [p, qλr] and
µ′ ∈ (µσ, 1) such that s ∈ [pµ′r, q]. Since p ∼ qλr, we have that p ∼ s and since
pσq ∼ pµσr, we have that s ∼ pµσr. Since I(s) is convex, it follows that s ∼ pµ′q.
However, by construction of µ′, we have that pµ′r ≻ q. Then, lower betweenness
implies that pµ′r ≻ s, which is a contradiction. Hence, p ≻ qλr.
(iii) U(p) is convex: Let q, r ∈ U(p) and λ ∈ [0, 1]. If p ≻ qλr, then since ≻ satisfies
Archimedean continuity by Lemma 1, there is λ′ ∈ (λ, 1) such that p ∼ qλ′r. Hence,
we may assume without loss of generality that p ∼ qλr.
First consider the case that q ∼ r. The proof for this case is illustrated in Figure 5c.
Since by continuity of ≻, L(q) is open, there is µ ∈ (0, 1) such that q ≻ pµr. Since
qλr ∼ p, qλr ∼ r, and I(qλr) is convex by Claim 3, it follows that pµr ∼ qλr. As
≻ satisfies lower betweenness by Claim 2, r ≻ p implies that pµr % p. If pµr ≻ p,
Archimedean continuity of ≻ implies that pµr ∼ pσq for some σ ∈ (0, 1). Then,
for s ∈ [p, qλr] ∩ [pµr, pσq], we have that pµr ∼ s. Otherwise pµr ∼ p. In any
case, there is s ∈ [p, qλr) such that pµr ∼ qλr, pµr ∼ s, and qλr ∼ s. Hence, by
Claim 1, ≻ is all indifferent on conv(pµr, qλr, s). Since by continuity of ≻, L(r) is
open, there is σ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that r ≻ pσ′q. Let µ∗ ∈ [0, 1) such that ≻ satisfies
µ∗-lower betweenness on [r, pσ′q], which exists by Claim 2. Moreover, let t ∈ (p, r)
such that [q, t] ∩ [r, rµ∗(pσ′q)] 6= ∅ and [q, t] ∩ [s, qλr] 6= ∅, which exists since µ∗ < 1
and s ∈ [p, qλr). Since we have that qλr ∼ p and qλr ∼ r and I(qλr) is convex by
Claim 3, we have that qλr ∼ t.
Let t′ ∈ [p, qλr]∩ [q, t]. Since ≻ is all indifferent on conv(pµr, qλr, s) as shown before,
in particular, ≻ is all indifferent on conv(pµr, qλr, s) ∩ [t, t′]. From (i), we know that
L(q)∪I(q) is convex. Hence, q % t. By Claim 2, this implies that t′ % t. If t′ ≻ t then
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again Claim 2 implies that t′ ≻ t′′ for all t′′ ∈ [t, t′), which contradicts that ≻ is all
indifferent on conv(pµr, qλr, s)∩ [t, t′]. Hence, t ∼ t′. Moreover, since p ∼ qλr, qλr ∼
t′. Hence, by Claim 1, ≻ is all indifferent on conv(qλr, t, t′). This is a contradiction,
since conv(qλr, t, t′) ∩ [r, rµ∗(pσ′r)] contains a sub-interval of [r, rµ∗(pσ′r)] by the
choice of t.
In the remaining case, we may assume without loss of generality that q ≻ r.
Archimedean continuity of ≻ implies that there is σ ∈ (0, 1) such that pσq ∼ r.
The fact that p ∼ qλr implies that p ∼ s for s ∈ [p, qλr] ∩ [pσq, r]. By Claim 2,
it follows from q ≻ p that pσq % p. If pσq ≻ p, we get a contradiction by apply-
ing the previous case to p, pσq, and r. So assume that p ∼ pσq. The proof for
this case is illustrated in Figure 5d. Observe that, since pσq ∼ p and pσq ∼ r and
I(pσq) is convex by Claim 3, it holds that, for all s′ ∈ conv(p, pσq, r), pσq ∼ s′.
Similarly, since s ∼ p, s ∼ pσq, and s ∼ r and I(s) is convex, it holds that, for all
s′ ∈ conv(p, pσq, s) ∪ conv(p, r, s) = conv(p, pσq, r), s ∼ s′. Since, by continuity of
≻, L(r) is open, there is σ′ ∈ (σ, 1) such that r ≻ pσ′q. Let µ∗ ∈ [0, 1) such that
≻ satisfies µ∗-lower betweenness on [r, pσ′q], which exists by Claim 2. Moreover, let
t ∈ [p, r] such that [pσq, t]∩[r, rµ∗(pσ′q)] 6= ∅. As shown above, we have that pσq ∼ s,
pσq ∼ t, and s ∼ t. Thus, by Claim 1, ≻ is all indifferent on conv(pσq, s, t). By the
choice of t, there are µ, µ′ ∈ [µ∗, 1] such that rµ(pσ′q), rµ′(pσ′q) ∈ conv(pσq, s, t) and
rµ(pσ′q) ≻ rµ′(pσ′q), which is a contradiction to the fact that ≻ is all indifferent on
conv(pσq, s, t). Hence, in any case, we have that qλr ≻ p.
(iv) U(p)∪I(p) is convex: Let q, r ∈ U(p)∪I(p) and λ ∈ [0, 1]. The cases that q, r ∈ U(p)
and q, r ∈ I(p) are covered by (iii) and the fact that I(p) is convex, respectively.
Hence, we may assume without loss of generality that q ∈ U(p) and r ∈ I(p). Assume
for contradiction that qλr 6∈ U(p) ∪ I(p), i.e., p ≻ qλr. Archimedean continuity of ≻
implies that p ∼ qλ′r for some λ′ ∈ (λ, 1). But then, since I(p) is convex, p ∼ qλ′r
and p ∼ r imply that p ∼ qλr, which is a contradiction.
F. SSB Utility Representation Theorem
In this section, we show that every preference relation in R admits a representation through
an SSB function. This is proven by reduction to Fishburn’s (1982) SSB representation
theorem, which states that every relation satisfying Archimedean continuity, dominance,
and symmetry can be represented by an SSB function. A preference relation ≻ satisfies
52
dominance if, for all p, q, r ∈ ∆ and λ ∈ (0, 1),
p ≻ q and p % r imply p ≻ qλr,
q ≻ p and r % p imply qλr ≻ p, and
p ∼ q and p ∼ r imply p ∼ qλr.
(Dominance)
Informally, dominance requires that for every outcome p, I(p) is a hyperplane through p
separating U(p) and L(p).
Proposition 3. A preference relation ≻ can be represented by an SSB function if and only
if it satisfies continuity, convexity, and symmetry.
Proof. It is easy to see that every preference relation that admits a representation through
an SSB function satisfies continuity, convexity, and symmetry. So we only prove the
“if part” here. Let ≻ be a preference relation satisfying continuity, convexity, and sym-
metry. Fishburn (1982, Theorem 1) has shown that every preference relation satisfying
Archimedean continuity, dominance, and symmetry can be represented by an SSB func-
tion. By Lemma 1, ≻ satisfies Archimedean continuity. Hence, it suffices to show that ≻
satisfies dominance.
First observe that, by convexity of ≻, U(p) ∪ I(p) and L(p) ∪ I(p) are convex. As the
intersection of convex sets, (U(p) ∪ I(p)) ∩ (L(p) ∪ I(p)) = I(p) is convex, too. Hence, for
all p, q, r ∈ ∆ with p ∼ q and p ∼ r and λ ∈ (0, 1), we have that p ∼ qλr. This establishes
the indifference part of dominance.
Next, we prove two auxiliary statements:
(i) For all p, q ∈ ∆ with p ≻ q and λ ∈ (0, 1), p ≻ pλq ≻ q. This condition is known
as betweenness (see, e.g., Chew, 1989). Assume for contradiction that betweenness
is not satisfied. Then, there are p, q ∈ ∆ with p ≻ q and λ ∈ (0, 1) such that either
p 6≻ pλq or pλq 6≻ q. In the first case, convexity of L(p) ∪ I(p) implies that p % pλq,
since p ∼ p and p ≻ q by assumption. Hence, p ∼ pλq. Let λ∗ = infλ∈[0,1]{p ∼ pλq}.
By continuity of ≻, L(p)∩ [p, q] is open in [p, q] and hence, I(p)∩ [p, q] = [p, q] \L(p)
is closed in [p, q]. Hence, p ∼ pλ∗q. In particular, λ∗ ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, by convexity
of ≻, I(p) ∩ [p, q] and L(p) ∩ [p, q] are convex. Hence, I(p) ∩ [p, q] = [p, pλ∗q] and
L(p) ∩ [p, q] = (pλ∗q, q]. Note that, since indifference sets are convex, it follows that
pλ′q ∼ pλ′′q for all λ′, λ′′ ∈ [λ∗, 1].
Let λ¯ ∈ (max{0, 2λ∗ − 1}, λ∗) and q¯ = pλ¯q. So λ¯ is chosen such that q¯ is closer
to pλ∗q than pλ∗q is to p. Since λ¯ < λ∗, p ≻ q¯. Now let r = p and λ˜ ∈ (λ¯, λ∗).
Since 2λ∗ < 1 + λ¯ by construction, we have 1/2 p + 1/2 q¯ = 1/2 (p1q) + 1/2 (pλ¯q) =
p((1 + λ¯)/2)q ∈ [p, pλ∗q] ⊆ I(p). Thus, r ∼ 1/2 p+ 1/2 q¯. Moreover, q¯λ˜p = (pλ¯q)λ˜p =
p(λ¯ + 1 − λ˜)q ∼ 1/2 q¯ + 1/2 r, since λ¯+ 1 − λ˜ > λ¯ + 1 − λ∗ > 2λ∗ − 1 + 1 − λ∗ = λ∗.
However, 1/2 p + 1/2 r = p ≻ pλ˜q¯, since λ˜ < λ∗, which contradicts symmetry. An
analogous argument takes care of the case pλq 6≻ q.
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Figure 6: Illustration of the proof of Proposition 3. A solid line with or without arrow-
head from one outcome u to another outcome v denotes that u ≻ v or u ∼ v,
respectively.
(ii) For all p, q, r ∈ ∆, if there are p¯, q¯, r¯ ∈ conv(p, q, r) such that the affine hull of p¯,
q¯, and r¯ is equal to the affine hull of p, q, and r, and p¯ ∼ q¯, p¯ ∼ r¯, and q¯ ∼ r¯,
then p ∼ q, p ∼ r, and q ∼ r. For contradiction, assume without loss of generality
that p ≻ q. First, observe that the indifference part of dominance implies that, for
all s, t ∈ conv(p¯, q¯, r¯), s ∼ t. Let x be in the relative interior of conv(p¯, q¯, r¯). For
y ∈ conv(p, q, r), let λ ∈ (0, 1) such that yλx ∈ conv(p¯, q¯, r¯). If y 6∼ x, then by (i),
yλx 6∼ x, which is a contradiction. Hence, x ∼ y, i.e., every outcome in the relative
interior of conv(p¯, q¯, r¯) is indifferent to every lottery in conv(p, q, r). Now let µ ∈ (0, 1)
such that q∗ = qµx is in the relative interior of conv(p¯, q¯, r¯). Then, p ∼ q∗, p ∼ x, and
q∗ ∼ x by what we have shown before. This implies that, for all s, t ∈ conv(p, q∗, x),
s ∼ t. Since ≻ satisfies continuity, U(q) is open and hence, U(q) ∩ [p, x] is open in
[p, x]. Thus, there is p∗ ∈ (p, x) such that p∗ ≻ q. For σ ∈ (0, 1) close to one, we have
that p∗σq ∈ conv(p, q∗, x), which implies that p∗ ∼ p∗σq. However, by (i), we have
that p∗ ≻ p∗σq, which is a contradiction.
Now we are ready to show the missing parts of dominance. To this end, let p, q, r ∈ ∆
and λ ∈ (0, 1). We first show that p ≻ q and p % r imply p ≻ qλr. If p ≻ q and p ≻ r, it
follows from convexity of L(p) that p ≻ qλr. If p ≻ q and p ∼ r, it follows from convexity
of L(p) ∪ I(p) that p % qλr. Assume for contradiction that p ∼ qλr. We distinguish three
cases, illustrated in Figure 6:
(iii) q ∼ r: The indifference part of dominance implies that qλr ∼ r. Hence, we have that
p ∼ r, p ∼ qλr, and qλr ∼ r. By (ii), we have p ∼ q, which contradicts p ≻ q.
(iv) q ≻ r: Since by assumption p ≻ q and q ≻ r and since, by Lemma 1, ≻ satisfies
Archimedean continuity, there is µ ∈ (0, 1) such that q ∼ pµr. Let q¯ ∈ [p, qλr] ∩
[q, pµr]. Then, by the indifference part of dominance, p ∼ q¯, p ∼ pµr, and q¯ ∼ pµr.
By (ii), we have p ∼ q, which contradicts p ≻ q.
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(v) r ≻ q: Continuity of ≻ implies that L(p) ∩ [q, r] is open in [q, r] and I(p) ∩ [q, r] =
[q, r]\L(p) is closed in [q, r]. Convexity of≻ implies that L(p)∩[q, r] and I(p)∩[q, r] are
convex. Hence, there is λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that L(p)∩ [q, r] = [q, qλ∗r) and I(p)∩ [q, r] =
[qλ∗r, r]. Let q¯ ∈ [q, qλ∗r) and r¯ ∈ (qλ∗r, r] such that qλ∗r = 1/2 q¯+ 1/2 r¯. Such q¯ and
r¯ exist, since λ∗ ∈ (0, 1). By construction, p ≻ q¯ and p ∼ r¯. Since r ∼ p and r ≻ q¯
by assumption and (i), convexity of L(r) ∪ I(r) implies that r % 1/2 p+ 1/2 q¯.
– If r ∼ 1/2 p + 1/2 q¯, let p¯ ∈ [p, qλ∗r] ∩ [r, 1/2 p + 1/2 q¯]. Then, p ∼ p¯, p ∼ r, and
p¯ ∼ r. By (ii), this contradicts p ≻ q.
– Now consider the case that r ≻ 1/2 p+1/2 q¯. From (i), it follows that 1/2 p+1/2 q¯ ≻
q¯, because p ≻ q¯. By Lemma 1, ≻ satisfies Archimedean continuity and hence,
1/2 p+1/2 q¯ ∼ s for some s ∈ [q¯, r]. If s ∈ (qλ∗r, r), let p¯ ∈ [p, qλ∗r]∩[1/2 p+1/2 q¯, s],
which is non-empty in this case. Then, p¯ ∼ qλ∗r and p¯ ∼ 1/2 p + 1/2 q¯. Since
I(p¯) is convex, it follows that [qλ∗r, 1/2 p + 1/2 q¯] ⊆ I(p¯). If p¯ ≻ q, then for
q′ ∈ [qλ∗r, 1/2 p+1/2 q¯]∩[p¯, q], we have by (i) that p¯ ≻ q′, which is a contradiction.
So p¯ ∼ q. Then, again by (i), for t ∈ [p, r] such that p¯ ∈ [t, q], t ∼ q. However,
since p ≻ q and r ≻ q by assumption, it follows from convexity of U(q) that
t ≻ q, which is a contradiction.
If s ∈ (q¯, qλ∗r], it follows from symmetry of ≻ that 1/2 p + 1/2 r¯ ∼ t for some
t ∈ [qλ∗r, r¯). Let p¯ ∈ (p, r) such that 1/2 p + 1/2 r¯ ∈ [p¯, t]. It follows from (i)
that p¯ ∼ t. Hence, p ∼ p¯, p ∼ 1/2 p + 1/2 r¯, and p¯ ∼ 1/2 p + 1/2 r¯. By (ii), this
contradicts p ≻ q.
The fact that q ≻ p and r % p imply qλr ≻ p can be shown analogously.
Noteworthily, Proposition 3 does not hold if symmetry is replaced by the weaker notion
of symmetry considered by Fishburn (1982), which only applies to cases where p, q, and
r as in the definition of symmetry in Section 5 are linearly ordered (cf. Footnote 8). The
preference relation for U = {a, b} given in Section 5 satisfies Fishburn’s notion of symmetry
(since there are no three outcomes that are linearly ordered) but cannot be represented by
an SSB function.
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